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THE LIMITS OF GLOBAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE 
David S. Law* & Wen-Chen Chang** 
Abstract: The notion that “global judicial dialogue” is contributing to the globalization of 
constitutional law has attracted considerable attention. Various scholars have characterized 
the citation of foreign law by constitutional courts as a form of “dialogue” that both reflects 
and fosters the emergence of a common global enterprise of constitutional adjudication. It 
has also been claimed that increasing direct interaction between judges, face-to-face or 
otherwise, fuels the growth of a global constitutional jurisprudence. 
This Article challenges these claims on empirical grounds and offers an alternative 
account of the actual reasons for which constitutional courts engage in comparative analysis. 
First, it is both conceptually and factually inaccurate to characterize the manner in which 
constitutional courts cite and analyze foreign jurisprudence as a form of “dialogue.” As a 
conceptual matter, constitutional courts do not cite one another for the purpose of 
communicating with another, while as an empirical matter, there is little evidence to suggest 
that one-sided citation of a handful of highly prestigious courts has given way to genuine 
two-way dialogue.  Second, judicial interaction is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause 
of constitutional globalization. Rather, the effect of such interaction on the extent to which 
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judges engage in comparativism is dwarfed by institutional and structural variables that lie 
largely beyond judicial control. 
The relative unimportance of judicial interaction is illustrated by a comparative case 
study of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China (Taiwan), which is akin to a 
natural experiment in the capacity of a constitutional court to make use of foreign law even 
when it is largely deprived of contact with other courts.  Taiwan’s precarious diplomatic 
situation effectively precludes the members of its Constitutional Court from participating in 
international judicial gatherings or visits to foreign courts. Nevertheless, the Taiwanese 
Constitutional Court nearly always engages in extensive comparative constitutional analysis, 
either expressly or implicitly, when rendering its decisions. To explain how and why the 
Court makes use of foreign law notwithstanding its isolation, this Article combines 
quantitative analysis of citations to foreign law in the Court’s published opinions with in-
depth interviews of numerous current and former members of the Court and their clerks. 
Comparison of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court and U.S. Supreme Court demonstrates 
that “global judicial dialogue” plays a much smaller role in shaping a court’s utilization of 
foreign law than institutional factors such as (a) the rules and practices governing the 
composition and staffing of the court and (b) the extent to which the structure of legal 
education and the legal profession incentivizes judges and academics to possess expertise in 
foreign law. Notwithstanding the fact that American justices enjoy unsurpassed opportunities 
to interact with judges from other countries, comparative analysis plays a less frequent role in 
their own constitutional jurisprudence than in that of their foreign counterparts. Openness on 
the part of individual justices to foreign law ultimately cannot compensate for the fact that 
the hiring and instructional practices of American law schools neither demand nor reward the 
possession of foreign legal expertise. 
This Article also documents the fact that judicial opinions are a highly misleading source 
of data about judicial usage of foreign law. Interviews with members of the Taiwanese 
Constitutional Court and their clerks reveal the existence of a large gap between the 
frequency with which the court cites foreign law in its opinions and the extent to which it 
actually considers foreign law. Analysis of judicial opinions alone may lead scholars to 
conclude mistakenly that a court rarely engages in comparative analysis when, in fact, such 
analysis is highly routine. 
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INTRODUCTION: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? 
No aspect of the globalization of constitutional law has thus far 
attracted more attention or controversy than the use of foreign and 
international legal materials by constitutional courts.1 Although judicial 
citation of foreign law is hardly a new phenomenon, there is a 
widespread sense that constitutional courts are turning more frequently 
to foreign jurisprudence for guidance and inspiration.2 Moreover, the 
manner in which courts and judges interact with one another has 
changed in ways that are said to have systemic implications for the 
global evolution of constitutional law. Prominent scholars and jurists 
now speak in glowing terms of the emergence of a “global” or 
“international” or “transnational judicial dialogue”3 that unites judges 
                                                     
1. For descriptions of the debate itself, see, for example, Roger P. Alford, Four Mistakes in the 
Debate on “Outsourcing Authority,” 69 ALB. L. REV. 653, 656–64 (2006); David S. Law, Generic 
Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 699–701 (2005); and Adam Liptak, U.S. Court, a 
Longtime Beacon, Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at A1. For examples 
of scholarly criticism of the judicial use of foreign law in constitutional cases, see ROBERT H. BORK, 
COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 22–25 (2003); JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW 
WITHOUT NATIONS?: WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES 22–23 
(2005); Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 57, 61–69 (2004); Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL 
AFF., July–Aug. 2004, at 40–42; and Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic 
Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 72–80 (2004). 
2. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 1, at A1; Antonin Scalia, Outsourcing American Law: Foreign 
Law in Constitutional Interpretation 5 (Am. Enter. Inst., Working Paper No. 152, 2009), available 
at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20090820-Chapter2.pdf (lamenting that the citation of foreign law in 
constitutional cases appears to be the “wave of the future”). But see David Zaring, The Use of 
Foreign Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 297, 
299 (2006) (suggesting that “the Supreme Court uses less foreign law now than it has at any other 
time in its history”). 
3. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–103 (2004); Claire 
L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the 
Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 40 (1998); Michael Kirby, Transnational Judicial Dialogue, 
Internationalisation of Law, and Australian Judges, 9 MELB. J. INT’L L. 171, 173–81 (2008); Basil 
Markesinis & Jorg Fedtke, The Judge as Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REV. 11, 15–17 (2005); Melissa 
Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating 
and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 492 (2005); Katharine G. Young, The World, 
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around the world in a “common global judicial enterprise.”4 It is said 
that, by engaging in “open” and “self-conscious” debate with courts in 
other countries over common questions of both substance and 
methodology, constitutional courts not only “improve the quality of their 
particular national decisions,” but also “contribute to a nascent global 
jurisprudence,” most notably in the area of human rights.5 
Several varieties of global judicial dialogue are said to exist.  One 
variety, which has already been mentioned, is comparative analysis of 
the type found in judicial decisions. Although judicial citation of foreign 
law is hardly a new phenomenon,6 it is increasingly suggested that the 
manner in which constitutional courts analyze the work of their 
counterparts in other countries is characterized by such a degree of 
mutual engagement and substantive debate that it amounts to an ongoing 
conversation conducted through the medium of judicial opinions.7 A 
second variety of global judicial dialogue is dialogue in a literal sense, in 
the form of “direct interactions”8 and networking among judges. This 
type of dialogue has been fostered by technological advances, such as 
the internet, that have lowered the barriers to international 
communication, and by the deliberate efforts of academic institutions, 
intergovernmental and international organizations, and constitutional 
courts themselves to generate proliferating opportunities for face-to-face 
                                                     
Through the Judge’s Eye, 28 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 27, 31 (2009); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, 
Jr., “I’d Like to Teach the World to Sing (In Perfect Harmony)”: International Judicial Dialogue 
and the Muses—Reflections on the Perils and the Promise of International Judicial Dialogue, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1321, 1323 n.6, 1329 (2006) (reviewing various terms that scholars have used to 
refer to the same phenomenon, and noting that “advocates” of “international judicial dialogue” “far 
outnumber its critics”); Gerald Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 87 (2004) (identifying institutional reasons for the Supreme 
Court to engage in “normative dialogue” with constitutional courts and human rights tribunals). 
4. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 99. 
5. Id. at 70. 
6. See, e.g., DAVID B. GOLDMAN, GLOBALISATION AND THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION: 
RECURRING PATTERNS OF LAW AND AUTHORITY 125 (2007) (noting that the use of Continental law 
by English judges and practitioners “increased markedly” from the fourteenth through sixteenth 
centuries). Even the U.S. Supreme Court, which has acquired a reputation for not citing foreign law, 
see Liptak, supra note 1, at A1; L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 37–38, has a long history of 
citing foreign law that dates back to its creation. See Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson 
Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the 
Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 756–92 (2005) (cataloguing the 
Court’s relatively frequent invocation of the “law of nations” and Roman law from the nation’s 
founding through 1840). 
7. See sources cited supra note 3. 
8. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 70; see also, e.g., VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 100 (2010) (pointing to the existence of “a body of 
judicial ‘networks’” comprised of “constitutional court judges who communicate with each other 
and meet at conferences and fora around the world”). 
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interaction, in the form of conferences, visits, and the like.9 
It is not the goal of this Article to contribute to the normative debate 
over whether global judicial dialogue is cause for celebration or 
consternation. Nor is it our purpose to evaluate the normative arguments 
in favor of an interpretive posture of “engagement”10 or a “dialogical” 
approach to comparative analysis.11 This Article aims, instead, to explain 
as an empirical matter why the concept of “global judicial dialogue” 
neither describes the actual practice of comparative analysis by judges 
nor explains the emergence of a global constitutional jurisprudence.  We 
also demonstrate that the frequency with which a court cites foreign law 
in its opinions is an extremely unreliable measure of the extent to which 
the court actually makes use of foreign law. Scholars who wish to 
understand or measure a particular court’s usage of foreign law must 
therefore be prepared to supplement quantitative research methods, such 
as statistical analysis of citations to foreign law, with qualitative 
approaches that are capable of probing more deeply, such as interviews 
with court personnel. 
Part II of this Article argues that the notion of “dialogue” is, both 
conceptually and empirically, an inapt metaphor for the comparative 
analysis performed by constitutional courts. Part III takes advantage of a 
natural experiment in judicial isolation to show that judge-to-judge 
dialogue and “judicial networks,” as eye-catching as they may be, have 
limited impact on constitutional adjudication and do little to explain the 
frequency or sophistication with which constitutional judges resort to 
foreign law. The natural experiment that we evaluate goes by the name 
of Taiwan—a democratic country with an active constitutional court that 
is nevertheless systematically deprived of opportunities to interact 
directly with other courts for a combination of historical and political 
                                                     
9. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 99; see, e.g., Kirby, supra note 3, at 179 (describing various 
venues for transnational judicial dialogue, and observing that the process of “bring[ing] national 
judges of many countries together to discuss issues in common . . . has now been under way for 
decades”). A third variety of judicial dialogue, which is closely identified with the traditional 
concept of judicial comity but is not at issue in this Article, consists of the dialogue in which courts 
engage when overlapping jurisdiction forces them to address potential conflict over the resolution of 
specific cases. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 65; Waters, supra note 3, at 180–81. 
10. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 72; see id. at 98 (arguing that “[t]he force of [the idea of 
independent judging], together with increases in institutional networks of judges and increased 
communications among courts, promotes, in various ways, a willingness to consider and refer to 
foreign and international legal materials . . . in a spirit of engagement”). 
11. See Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of 
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 833–41, 885–92 (1999) (contrasting 
and evaluating “genealogical,” “universalist,” and “dialogical” modes of comparative constitutional 
interpretation, and concluding that the “dialogical” mode best meets the demands of “scope” and 
“legitimacy,” if not also “constitutional culture”). 
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reasons.  Our case study of Taiwan combines quantitative and qualitative 
empirical research methods, in the form of statistical analysis of the 
Taiwanese Constitutional Court’s decisions and numerous off-the-record 
interviews with members of the Court and their law clerks. Although the 
Court rarely cites foreign law, foreign legal research forms a routine and 
indispensable part of its deliberations. Taiwan’s experience strongly 
suggests that judicial interaction and networking play a much smaller 
role in shaping a court’s utilization of foreign law than institutional 
factors such as the rules and practices governing the composition and 
staffing of the court and the extent to which the structure of legal 
education and the legal profession incentivizes judges and academics to 
possess expertise in foreign law. Comparison of the Taiwanese 
Constitutional Court with the U.S. Supreme Court, which rarely looks to 
foreign law for inspiration notwithstanding its extensive participation in 
various forms of global judicial dialogue, only reinforces this 
conclusion. This comparison is performed in Part IV. The Article 
concludes by highlighting the role that American legal education must 
play if the global influence of American constitutionalism is to be 
revived, or if American courts are to engage in comparativism of their 
own. 
I. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: DIALOGUE OR MONOLOGUE? 
Advocates of the global judicial dialogue thesis argue that the manner 
in which courts today engage in comparative analysis can be 
characterized as a form of dialogue. An oft-cited account is that of 
former Canadian Supreme Court Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, who 
suggests that current patterns of jurisprudential influence are 
qualitatively different from those of the past.12 Whereas courts 
previously influenced one another through a process of “reception,” in 
which colonial powers and global hegemons engaged in “one-way 
transmission” of constitutional jurisprudence that courts in weaker 
countries would simply receive and imitate, constitutional courts now 
engage in an “active and ongoing dialogue”13 wherein they evaluate the 
work of other courts in open-minded yet critical fashion and, in so doing, 
contribute to an ongoing conversation on matters of substance.14 This 
                                                     
12. L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 21. 
13. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 66 (referring to a female “Canadian constitutional court 
justice”). 
14. L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 21 (noting that “it was appropriate, until recently, to speak 
of the interaction among judges in different places as a process where some courts impacted others,” 
and arguing that, by contrast, judges are now “mutually reading and discussing each others’ 
jurisprudence” to “a greater and greater extent”) (emphasis in original); see, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra 
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move from a paradigm of “reception” to one of “dialogue” is attributed 
to processes of globalization that have lowered the barriers to global 
interaction and thereby enabled constitutional courts to look to a broader 
range of jurisdictions with greater ease and sophistication.15 
The use of dialogue as a metaphor for the comparative analysis found 
in constitutional decisions is problematic on multiple levels. A threshold 
problem is that of whether comparative analysis can be characterized as 
“dialogue” as a purely conceptual or definitional matter. “Dialogue” is 
defined by the Oxford English Dictionary in the following ways: (1) “A 
conversation carried on between two or more persons; a colloquy, talk 
together”; (2) “Verbal interchange of thought between two or more 
persons, conversation”; and (3) “discussion or diplomatic contact 
between the representatives of two nations, groups, or the like,” or, more 
generally, “valuable or constructive discussion or communication.”16 
None of these definitions fits the practice of comparative analysis by 
constitutional courts terribly well. Two speakers addressing different 
audiences cannot be described as engaged in a dialogue with each other, 
even if they happen to conduct their conversations within earshot of each 
other. Nor can it be said that a dialogue exists between the two speakers 
if they eavesdrop upon each other, or even if each speaker happens to 
discuss the content of what is heard with his or her own audience. So, 
too, with constitutional courts. The act of judicial review may involve a 
substantial amount of dialogue,17 but it is not dialogue with 
constitutional courts in other countries. The decisions that a court 
renders are necessarily targeted first and foremost at the domestic 
audiences who will be legally bound by them.18 As a practical matter, 
the reactions of courts in other countries are at most a secondary 
consideration for a court grappling with a grave and controversial 
question of constitutional law, assuming that they are a consideration at 
all.19 Indeed, constitutional judges who choose to write with foreign 
                                                     
note 3, at 66, 70; Waters, supra note 3, at 492–93. 
15. L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 16–23. 
16. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989 & online version Nov. 2010). 
17. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 707, 757 (2001) (discussing mechanisms for encouraging “inter-institutional dialogue” 
between constitutional courts and legislatures). 
18. Exceptions to the practical requirement that domestic courts address their opinions to those 
who will be bound by them are noteworthy precisely because they are exceptional. See Young, 
supra note 3, at 28–29 & n.8 (suggesting that former Australian High Court Justice Kirby’s “outlier 
interpretations” were written less for other Australian justices or even future generations of 
Australians, than for a global audience). 
19. See, e.g., Interview with Justice G, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan, Dec. 27, 2010 (explaining that, when deciding constitutional 
cases, the members of Taiwan’s Constitutional Court “think primarily of the [decision’s] impact on 
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audiences in mind do so at their own peril, as Justice Breyer discovered 
firsthand when he dared to cite a decision by the Supreme Court of 
Zimbabwe, partly in the hope of offering succor to the beleaguered judge 
who had authored the opinion.20 
The outpouring of outrage and ridicule elicited by this passing 
citation21—which ultimately led Justice Breyer himself to disavow the 
citation as ill-advised22—highlights another reason why dialogue is not 
an apt metaphor for what constitutional courts are actually doing when 
they engage in comparative analysis. As an initial matter, it is not 
difficult to see why the notion of dialogue might be an especially 
appealing metaphor for elite lawyers and judges steeped in the tenets of 
political liberalism23 and the Legal Process school.24 In the face of the 
                                                     
society, how people will feel, what this will do to them, and what this will do to the development of 
the country. We will also think of how this makes us look internationally. A more distant 
consideration, but we do think about it.”). 
20. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(citing, inter alia, Catholic Comm’n for Justice & Peace in Zimb. v. Attorney-Gen., 1993 (1) Zimb. 
L. Rep. 242(S), 252, 282). In a debate with Justice Scalia held in 2005, Justice Breyer alluded to 
both his motives for referring to the decision in question and his subsequent misgivings about doing 
so: 
Look, let me be a little bit more frank, that in some of these countries there are institutions, 
courts that are trying to make their way in societies that didn’t used to be democratic, and they 
are trying to protect human rights, they are trying to protect democracy. They’re having a 
document called a constitution, and they want to be independent judges. And for years people 
all over the world have cited the Supreme Court, why don’t we cite them occasionally? They 
will then go to some of their legislators and others and say, “See, the Supreme Court of the 
United States cites us.” That might give them a leg up, even if we just say it’s an interesting 
example. So, you see, it shows we read their opinions. That’s important . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . I think I may have made what I call a tactical error in citing a case from Zimbabwe—not 
the human rights capital of the world. (Laughter.) But it was at an earlier time—Judge [Gubbay 
of Zimbabwe] was a very good judge. 
Justice Stephen Breyer & Justice Antonin Scalia, A Conversation on the Relevance of Foreign Law 
for American Constitutional Adjudication, Washington College of Law, American University, 
Washington, D.C., Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/2005/050113.cfm. 
Both the author of the decision cited by Justice Breyer—Chief Justice Gubbay of the Supreme Court 
of Zimbabwe—and the Zimbabwean judiciary more generally “had been under direct attack, 
including physical threats,” by the Mugabe government, and Chief Justice Gubbay was in fact 
subsequently forced to resign. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 99; see Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, 
Zimbabwe-Attacks on Justice 417–21 (11th ed. 2002), http://www.icj.org/dwn/database/Zimbabwe-
AttacksonJustice2002.pdf. 
21. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 1, at 23 (calling Justice Breyer’s use of case law from Zimbabwe 
“risible”); Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 89 (2005) 
(deeming it not only “a juridical error,” but also “imprudent[]” to “ask[] the American people . . . to 
accept that decisions by the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, one of the world’s most disordered 
nations, should influence decisions by our Supreme Court”). 
22. See supra note 20. 
23. See Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 14–16 
(1995) (noting the emphasis that procedurally oriented liberal democracies place upon the role of 
rational discourse in ensuring both liberty and peaceful coexistence). 
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deep diversity and intractable divisions that characterize political life at 
both the national and global levels, nothing would seem to hold greater 
hope for the peaceful, welfare-enhancing resolution of conflict in a 
manner that respects human dignity and equality than dialogue. No 
harm, and only good, can come of simply talking to one another: is it not 
self-evidently so? The metaphor of dialogue is further attractive because 
it both implies and promises that all participants are both entitled and 
empowered to speak.25 If comparative constitutional analysis is a form of 
dialogue on a global scale, then nothing ought to prevent the courts of 
Switzerland and Swaziland from participating in that dialogue on equal 
terms. Dialogue is supposed to be inclusive, and it is supposed to 
involve mutual engagement. Therein lies much of its appeal. 
And therein lies the problem as well. It is doubtful that the 
requirements of genuine dialogue can be reconciled with the politics of 
constitutional adjudication. In order for courts from more influential or 
powerful countries to treat courts in other countries with the respect and 
recognition due to fellow interlocutors in a true dialogue, they must both 
acknowledge and engage reciprocally with their interlocutors. Even if 
domestic stakeholders can accept a measure of foreign law usage, 
however, the type of foreign law usage that they are prepared to stomach 
is unlikely to be a citation practice that (1) respects all countries and 
courts as equals, and (2) is intended to allay foreign sensibilities or 
nurture a “common global judicial enterprise.”26 The fact that 
constitutional courts are compelled as a practical, if not also normative, 
matter, to satisfy the expectations and demands of domestic audiences 
frustrates the development of a transparent and egalitarian global judicial 
discourse. 
The use of the metaphor of dialogue to describe judicial 
comparativism is not only contrary to ordinary definition and political 
logic, but also lacking in empirical support. The handful of high-profile 
cases that tend to be recycled as evidence of dialogue do not appear to be 
                                                     
24. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to 
The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li, xciv, cxiii–cxxxvi (1994) (noting the 
Legal Process school’s emphasis upon deliberative procedures as a vehicle for reaching rational 
policy decisions in the face of “dispersed power and diverse views about substantive views,” and 
discussing the profound impact of this school of thought upon three generations of lawyers and legal 
scholars). 
25. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 71 (observing that the notion of dialogue implies “reciprocal 
intellectual give and take,” and suggesting that “engagement” is a more apt metaphor than 
“dialogue” because courts “may engage the work of other courts . . . without any necessary 
expectation of response”). 
26. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 99. 
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representative of overall practice.27 Consider the two courts that have 
been repeatedly identified as the most active and influential participants 
in global judicial dialogue of the comparative-analysis variety—namely, 
the Supreme Court of Canada and the South African Constitutional 
Court.28  It is reasonable to think that the most important participants in a 
so-called dialogue would refer to one another’s decisions. Indeed, two of 
the four cases that Justice L’Heureux-Dubé cites as evidence of the shift 
from “one-way transmission” to “dialogue” implicate both of these 
courts.29 Yet the exchange of ideas between these two courts is so 
lopsided that it is more accurately described as a monologue than a 
dialogue. As Justice L’Heureux-Dubé herself acknowledges, although 
the Canadian Supreme Court “is willing to look elsewhere, and does so 
frequently, it is cited by courts like those in Zimbabwe, South Africa, 
and Israel far more often than it refers to their cases.”30  This is, if 
anything, an understatement. In fact, the South African Constitutional 
Court cites decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court almost three 
hundred times more often than vice versa. Between 1995 and 2009, the 
justices of the South African Constitutional Court cited Canadian 
Supreme Court decisions on a collective total of 850 occasions.31 By 
                                                     
27. The standard examples include a trio of cases involving the death penalty: the South African 
Constitutional Court’s decision in State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (2) SA 391 (CC); the Canadian 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.); and the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 
8, at 56–57 (discussing Burns); id. at 78–79 (discussing Makwanyane); SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, 
at 80, 284 n.68 (discussing Makwanyane); Kirby, supra note 3, at 178 n.28, 186 n.81 (citing 
Makwanyane and Atkins); Waters, supra note 3, at 507 n.100, 557 n.315, 514–15 (discussing 
Makwanyane); id. at 521–23 (discussing Burns). 
28. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 74 (singling out the South African Constitutional 
Court and the “Canadian Constitutional Court” [sic] as “highly influential, apparently more so than 
the U.S. Supreme Court and other older and more established constitutional courts”); Heinz Klug, 
Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the “Rise of World Constitutionalism,” 
2000 WISC. L. REV. 597, 607 (noting that the “highest courts of constitutional review in Canada, 
India, South Africa, [and] Zimbabwe . . . all engage in extensive discussion of comparative 
constitutional jurisprudence”); Markesinis & Fedtke, supra note 3, at 45 (using the Supreme Court 
of Canada and Constitutional Court of South Africa to define the category of courts that make open 
and “wide-ranging use of foreign law”); Waters, supra note 3, at 558 n.316 (identifying the 
Canadian Supreme Court as “one of the most influential domestic courts worldwide on human 
rights issues”); Liptak, supra note 1, at A1 (“Many legal scholars single[] out the Canadian Supreme 
Court and the Constitutional Court of South Africa as increasingly influential.”). 
29. See L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 21–22 (citing Makwanyane, 1995 (2) SA 391 (CC) (S. 
Afr.), and Hugo v. South Africa (President) 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC)). The other two examples are a 
Namibian case, Mwellie v. Ministry of Works [1995] 4 L.R.C. 184 (Namib.), and a case from New 
Zealand, Police v. Smith & Herewini [1994] 2 NZLR 306 (CA). 
30. L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 27. 
31. See Christa Rautenbach, Presentation at the VIIIth World Congress of the International 
Association of Constitutional Law: Use of Foreign Precedents by South African Constitutional 
Judges: Making Sense of Statistics (Dec. 8, 2010). 
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comparison, over the same period of time the members of the Supreme 
Court of Canada cited decisions of their South African counterpart only 
three times.32 It is possible, of course, that the Canadian Supreme Court 
looks habitually to the South African Constitutional Court for guidance 
and inspiration and merely declines to cite foreign sources explicitly.33 
But nothing in Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s firsthand account of her own 
court suggests that this might be the case.34 On the contrary, one of her 
former colleagues, Justice Michel Bastarache, reports that “attribution is 
systematic and considered mandatory” whenever the Canadian Supreme 
Court draws upon foreign jurisprudence.35 
The fact that the conversation between these two standard-bearers of 
                                                     
32. A search of the CANSCC-CS database on Westlaw conducted on February 4, 2011, for any 
appearance of the words “South Africa” between 1995 and 2009 yields a total of fifteen results; of 
these, only three involve actual citations to a decision of the South African Constitutional Court. See 
Marcovitz v. Bruker, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607; R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309; United States v. Burns, 
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 283; see also Bijon Roy, An Empirical Survey of Foreign Jurisprudence and 
International Instruments in Charter Litigation, 62 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 99, 125 (2004) 
(reporting that, from 1998 through 2003, the constitutional decisions of the Canadian Supreme 
Court referred to South African jurisprudence on just three occasions). 
33. As many scholars have noted—and as we document in this Article, see infra Parts III.F–
III.G—courts frequently engage in comparative analysis without acknowledging explicitly that they 
have done so. See, e.g., Markesinis & Fedtke, supra note 3, at 28–29 (noting that, although French 
judicial opinions are prevented for stylistic and historical reasons from citing foreign law or 
academic authorities, the avocats genereaux who advise the Cour de Cassation “are nowadays 
expected to consult foreign law when preparing their recommendations”) (emphasis in original); 
Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations 
on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 511 (2000) (distinguishing between 
“explicit” and “non-explicit” references to foreign law); Edward McWhinney, Judicial Review in a 
Federal and Plural Society: The Supreme Court of Canada, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS: 
CHALLENGING FRONTIERS IN CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 63, 69–70 (John R. 
Schmidhauser ed., 1987) (describing American-trained Canadian Supreme Court Justice Ivan 
Rand’s deliberate failure to acknowledge the American origins of certain approaches that he 
adopted, in light of resistance from his colleagues to the use of American law); Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 118 (1994) 
(“Considerable anecdotal evidence, gleaned from confidential interviews with law clerks of foreign 
courts and from careful reading between the lines, demonstrates that courts draw on the opinions of 
foreign courts without attribution.”). 
34. See L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 27. 
35. Michel Bastarache, How Internationalization of the Law Has Materialized in Canada, 59 U. 
NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 190, 200 (2009); see also id. at 196, 204 (stating that “the influence of 
judicial borrowing in Canada is overstated by some,” and concluding that “internationalization has 
had a minimal impact on our Court to date”). Speaking on condition of anonymity, a former 
Canadian Supreme Court clerk confirmed that, in his own experience, foreign jurisprudence would 
be cited if it had been considered. See E-mail From Anonymous Former Law Clerk, Supreme Court 
of Can., to David S. Law (Sept. 16, 2011, 17:50 CDT) (on file with authors). But see Lorraine E. 
Weinrib, Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3, 25 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002) (stating 
that Canadian justices frequently considered foreign law in the years immediately following the 
1982 adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms but “often did not note their 
sources”). 
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constitutional comparativism amounts to a monologue raises a troubling 
question for those who liken such comparativism to “dialogue.” If the 
“highly influential” South African Constitutional Court36 maintains such 
a lopsided and disappointing balance of intellectual trade with a court 
that is renowned for its role in promoting global judicial dialogue, what 
hope do less influential or well-known courts have of being participants 
in a genuine “dialogue,” instead of engaging merely in “reception”?  
Moreover, it is not only courts from countries that are known for human 
rights abuses or otherwise lack international credibility, such as 
Zimbabwe, that risk exclusion from this so-called dialogue.  Rather, 
reputable courts from vibrant democracies, such as South Africa and 
Taiwan, are also effectively excluded.37 
Those who see the emergence of a “global judicial dialogue” are 
correct to observe that many constitutional courts pay careful attention to 
the decisions of their counterparts in other countries. That does not 
mean, however, that these courts can accurately be described as 
participants in a global judicial dialogue. Even if the intellectual traffic 
in ideas is growing, it continues to be largely one-way. The concept of 
dialogue implies open communication among interlocutors committed to 
listening as well as to speaking, and it holds out the promise of mutual 
learning and understanding. That is precisely why it is so appealing. But 
political realities, normative considerations, and enduring differences in 
prestige and credibility among courts all distort and restrict the flow of 
ideas to the point that the characteristics of genuine dialogue are lacking. 
When courts do analyze foreign jurisprudence, it often occurs 
surreptitiously, in the form of opinions that refrain from citing foreign 
law explicitly,38 or in ways that marginalize all but a small handful of 
elite courts.39 At least for now, efforts to characterize judicial 
comparativism as a form of dialogue are better understood as the 
expression of a hope for the future than as a descriptively accurate 
assessment of actual practice. 
                                                     
36. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 74. 
37. See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (describing the failure of other courts to cite the 
work of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court, even when it happens to be directly relevant). 
38. See supra note 33 (citing various examples of courts that routinely consider foreign law 
without also citing it). 
39. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text (describing the hostile and at times incredulous 
reaction to Justice Breyer’s citation of precedent from Zimbabwe); infra notes 62–63 and 
accompanying text (describing the extent to which other constitutional courts, even in the same 
region, have ignored the jurisprudence of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court). 
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II.  THE LIMITED IMPACT OF JUDGE-TO-JUDGE DIALOGUE 
A. Behind Closed Doors: The Mystery Surrounding Judge-to-Judge 
Dialogue 
Unlike the citation behavior of constitutional courts, judge-to-judge 
dialogue—or “J2J,” in the words of one justice40—is dialogue in the 
literal and truest sense of the word. Actual interaction between judges, 
especially of the face-to-face variety that receives such emphasis in the 
literature, feels at once both glamorous and vaguely conspiratorial. 
Existing accounts of this species of judicial dialogue, cobbled together 
from snippets and reports of closed meetings in Bangalore,41 
Johannesburg,42 and New Haven43 tantalize the reader with glimpses of 
something elusive and, for that very reason, seemingly important.  They 
conjure up an image of judges trotting the globe to chart the course of 
constitutional law behind closed doors before returning home to impose 
this master scheme on their unwitting compatriots, with no one the wiser 
except the judges themselves and perhaps a handful of privileged legal 
academics located predominantly at elite law schools in the northeastern 
United States that have the prestige and financial wherewithal to 
dispatch their faculty to wherever these judicial gatherings may occur or, 
better yet, to host such gatherings themselves.44 The resultant sense, 
perhaps, is that of being privy to the inner life of opaque “judicial 
networks” that engage in de facto global governance, or the exercise of 
power without authority, as part of a “new world order.”45 
The opposite and more skeptical view would be that the entire notion 
of J2J dialogue boils down to the unexceptional and inconsequential 
claim that judges enjoy a growing range of opportunities to socialize 
over cocktails and have also learned to e-mail one another. On this view, 
one might be forgiven for thinking that “the “global community of 
courts”46 constituted by transnational judicial dialogue is a toothless 
                                                     
40. Interview with Justice J, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 30, 2010). 
41. Kirby, supra note 3, at 179. 
42. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 66. 
43. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 8, at 102, 341 n.199; SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 98; Kirby, 
supra note 3, at 180; Waters, supra note 3, at 496. 
44. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 98 (citing conferences held at NYU Law School and 
Yale Law School); Kirby, supra note 3, at 179 (discussing, inter alia, the Bangalore conference); 
McCrudden, supra note 33, at 511; Waters, supra note 3, at 495–96. 
45. E.g., BORK, supra note 1, at 15–17, 137–38; RABKIN, supra note 1, at 41; SLAUGHTER, supra 
note 3, at 261–71. 
46. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 191, 192 (2003) 
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development that bears more resemblance to “a literary salon writ 
large”47 than an innovation in global governance capable of generating 
“an increasingly global constitutional jurisprudence.”48 
The empirical claims that are more typically made about the practical 
impact of J2J interaction are somewhat vague. A common theme, 
however, is that dialogue of the J2J variety encourages judges to engage 
in comparative analysis.49 Anne-Marie Slaughter, an early and 
prominent champion of global judicial dialogue, identifies a number of 
cognitive and social effects that “all these visits and exchanges and 
seminars” have on judges.50 These opportunities for interaction 
“educate” and “cross-fertilize,” “broaden the perspectives of the 
participating judges,” “socialize” them as “participants in a common 
global judicial enterprise,”51 and ultimately foster “an increasingly 
global constitutional jurisprudence” across a broad range of human 
rights issues.52 Melissa Waters is more circumspect but ultimately makes 
similar claims: “‘Face-to-face’ contact among the world’s judges is 
increasingly frequent,” “has undoubtedly been a major factor in certain 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ increased interest” in other forms of 
dialogue such as comparative analysis, and “has undoubtedly played a 
significant role in creating an environment” in which these other forms 
of “dialogue can flourish.”53 
The evidentiary support for these claims is anecdotal at best.  There is 
little reason to doubt that J2J dialogue does occur and has even increased 
in frequency. But it is reasonable to wonder whether inclusion in the 
latest judicial gathering at Yale Law School has any tangible effect on 
the development of a nation’s constitutional jurisprudence.54  Does J2J 
dialogue affect the way in which judges decide actual cases, and if so, 
                                                     
(describing a “community of courts” constituted by the “self-awareness” of judges who are “coming 
together in all sorts of ways,” “from seminars to training sessions and judicial organizations”). 
47. Law, supra note 1, at 702. 
48. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 66. 
49. See, e.g., id. at 66, 99; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Australia: Devotion to Legalism, in 
INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 106, 135 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006) 
(deeming “a marked increase in citations of foreign judgments” by Australian courts since 1980 “a 
consequence of ‘globalisation,’” along with “easier access to foreign materials through the internet, 
and increased interaction among judges at international conferences”); Kirby, supra note 3, at 173–
80 (linking “the advent of the internet,” “enhanced international travel,” and the proliferation of 
international judicial groups and gatherings to the increased use of international human rights law 
by national judges); Waters, supra note 3, at 495–96. 
50. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 99. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 66. 
53. Waters, supra note 3, at 495–96. 
54. See sources cited supra note 43; infra text accompanying note 117. 
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how? What are the content and consequences of this dialogue? To what 
extent is it substantive, and to what extent is it social or personal in 
nature? To the extent that it is substantive, does it furnish judges with 
knowledge that they would not otherwise possess or acquire? Whatever 
its content, does direct interaction between judges pique their curiosity 
about foreign law, or encourage them to cite other courts more often, as 
some scholars have suggested? And even assuming that dialogue of this 
kind does in fact increase judicial interest in foreign law, what is its 
importance relative to domestic institutional variables, such as the 
prevalence of foreign legal training or the availability of support 
personnel who have received such training? 
These questions are difficult to answer empirically for a number of 
reasons.  A methodological challenge is that such questions concern, for 
the most part, the content of private communication between 
government officials and the impact of such communication on decision-
making that also occurs behind closed doors. The only publicly available 
record of this behavior, for the most part, consists of the opinions that 
judges produce, which are painstakingly edited for public consumption 
and are neither designed nor intended to reveal the psychological or 
interpersonal dynamics behind their production. Quantitative analysis of 
these opinions cannot necessarily capture the frequency with which 
courts use foreign law, much less the reasons for which it is used. It is 
common practice for certain courts to consider foreign law without 
explicitly citing it in their opinions.55 Thus, perhaps the only way to 
investigate the content and consequences of transnational J2J dialogue is 
to interview actual judges about their own experiences. Constitutional 
court justices do not ordinarily volunteer, however, to talk candidly and 
in detail about the content of their private discussions with foreign 
judges, the nature and extent of their participation in the world’s judicial 
networks, and the reasons and motivations underlying their own usage of 
foreign law. 
Another methodological challenge is the need for cross-country 
comparison and identification of a suitable case study. In order to isolate 
the impact of J2J dialogue on judicial behavior, it would help greatly to 
compare the behavior of a constitutional court that engages in a 
considerable amount of J2J dialogue with that of a court that engages in 
very little. The literature is replete with examples of constitutional courts 
                                                     
55. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the frequency with which courts and 
judges decline to acknowledge foreign sources); infra note 63 (describing the reluctance of the 
South Korean Constitutional Court, Japanese Supreme Court, and Taiwanese Constitutional Court 
to explicitly cite foreign law, even when it has been taken into consideration). 
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that participate in this dialogue.56 But where might one find a court that 
does not? Ideally, one would study a constitutional court that is generally 
comparable in most respects to courts that do participate in transnational 
J2J dialogue—in other words, a court that belongs to a bona fide 
constitutional democracy and enjoys the freedom to embrace or reject 
techniques such as comparative analysis—yet has also for some reason 
been excluded from this dialogue. If globalization has indeed lowered 
the barriers to global interaction and thus rendered J2J dialogue 
increasingly ubiquitous, however, then such an isolated court ought not 
to exist. 
Enter Taiwan. 
B. A Natural Experiment in Dialogue Deprivation 
Although the two countries may be oceans apart, the country that still 
formally styles itself the Republic of China shares a number of key 
historical and political characteristics with South Africa, the darling of 
constitutional comparativists. Both are recent democratic success stories. 
Like South Africa, Taiwan endured years of both internal and external 
legitimacy crises, only to rapidly establish itself over the last two 
decades as one of the most vibrant and robust constitutional democracies 
in its region of the world.57  And like South Africa, Taiwan possesses an 
independent and active constitutional court with an outstanding 
intellectual pedigree, a large policy footprint, and a penchant for 
comparative analysis.58 
But it is there, unfortunately, that the similarities end. Unlike post-
apartheid South Africa, Taiwan remains diplomatically and politically 
isolated from the rest of the world, to an extent that even comparative 
constitutional scholars may not necessarily grasp.  As a result, unlike the 
South African Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of China (hereinafter the “Taiwanese Constitutional Court,” or 
“TCC”) faces severe constraints upon its ability to participate in the 
“judicial networks”59 and opportunities for judge-to-judge interaction 
that are so often emphasized in the literature on global judicial dialogue.  
And whereas the South African Constitutional Court is widely viewed as 
                                                     
56. See supra notes 2–3. 
57. See infra Part II.C. 
58. See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
ASIAN CASES 144–51 (2003) (describing the TCC’s role in dismantling the remnants of 
authoritarianism and reshaping the law in various areas along democratic lines); infra text 
accompanying notes 97–102 (discussing the educational background of the court’s members); infra 
Part III.G (discussing the court’s heavy usage of foreign law). 
59. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 65–103. 
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“highly” or even “disproportionately influential,”60 few scholars would 
dream of saying the same about the TCC—assuming, indeed, that they 
have ever given the TCC any thought at all.61 Over the course of 
numerous interviews with twelve current and former members of the 
TCC, not a single one believed that any of the TCC’s decisions had ever 
been cited by any other constitutional court. Neither the U.S. Supreme 
Court nor the Canadian Supreme Court has ever cited the TCC.62 Nor, 
indeed, have the TCC’s closest neighbors, the Supreme Court of Japan 
and the Constitutional Court of South Korea, ever done so.63 Yet 
                                                     
60. Id. at 74. 
61. For a prominent and important exception, see GINSBURG, cited above in note 58, at 106–57. 
For a discussion of just how widely ignored the TCC’s jurisprudence happens to be, see text 
accompanying notes 108–69 below. 
62. A search of all U.S. Supreme Court and Canadian Supreme Court decisions available on 
Westlaw for the terms “Interpretation No” and “Taiwan” uncovered not a single case in which either 
court cited a TCC decision. The closest that either court came to doing so was in National City Bank 
of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), which concerned the ability of the R.O.C. 
government to bring suit in federal court. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court cited two early 
decisions of Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan in 1929 and 1930, at which time Taiwan was still under 
Japanese rule and the Constitutional Court did not yet exist. See id. at 363 n.8, 364 n.10. 
63. Judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan and the Korean Constitutional Court can be 
searched at the official English websites of the two courts. See Judgments of the Supreme Court, 
SUPREME CT. OF JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/index.html (last visited Aug. 
31, 2011); CONST. CT. OF KOREA, http://english.ccourt.go.kr (last visited Aug. 31, 2011). The lack 
of citations by these two courts can be explained by the fact that, like Taiwan’s Constitutional 
Court, both the Japanese Supreme Court and the Korean Constitutional Court tend not to cite 
foreign law explicitly, even if they have investigated it in the course of reaching their decisions. See 
Akiko Ejima, Enigmatic Attitude of the Supreme Court of Japan towards Foreign Precedents: 
Refusal at the Front Door and Admission at the Back Door, 16 MEIJI L.J. 19, 21, 28–34 (2009) 
(reporting no direct citation of foreign cases in the majority opinions between January 1, 1990, and 
July 31, 2008, and only seven cases in which dissenting opinions directly cited foreign cases and 
four cases whose concurring opinions referred to foreign cases). 
Empirical studies of foreign law usage by South Korea’s Constitutional Court are lacking, but the 
Court’s extensive use of foreign law is evident from its case law as well as from interviews 
conducted with two former law clerks or “constitutional research officers.” One interviewee, who 
had two years of experience as a “constitutional research officer,” indicated that it is standard 
practice for that court’s researchers to investigate all relevant foreign law in every case and to report 
their findings to the justices; another with over a decade of experience estimated that research on 
foreign law occurs at least sixty percent of the time. See Interview with Former Constitutional 
Research Officer, Constitutional Court of Korea, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 25, 2011). Indeed, the 
Constitutional Court of Korea is currently in the midst of creating a research institute that will be 
staffed by full-time researchers who speak English, German, Japanese, or Spanish. See E-mail from 
Chulwoo Lee, Professor of Law, Yonsei University Graduate School of Law, to David S. Law (Feb. 
25, 2011, 20:13 PST) (on file with authors); The Constitutional Court Research Institute—
Professor/Researcher Recruitment Announcement (Feb. 25, 2011) (on file with the authors) 
(identifying four “zones of language” from which researchers will be hired). The Korean 
Constitutional Court has cited Taiwanese law in three recent cases, but in none of these cases did it 
refer to the jurisprudence of Taiwan’s Constitutional Court. See Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 
97Hun-Ka12, Aug. 31, 2000 (2000 DKCC, 52, 60) (S. Kor.), English translation available at 
http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/att_file/library/decision_2000.pdf (referring to Taiwan along with 
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notwithstanding its marginalization, the extent to which the TCC 
engages in comparative analysis is second to none—far more so, indeed, 
than a court such as the U.S. Supreme Court that enjoys virtually 
unlimited opportunities for judicial interaction. 
To gather data on the TCC’s participation in J2J dialogue and usage 
of foreign law, we conducted confidential, face-to-face interviews with 
twelve current and former members of the Court and nine current law 
clerks.64 We also analyzed all of the TCC’s constitutional decisions—
including majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions—for either 
explicit or implicit references to foreign law.65 In order to provide the 
necessary factual context for our findings, however, we must first delve 
into the history of Taiwan and the organization of the TCC. Part III.C 
summarizes Taiwan’s political history and relationship with China, 
while Part III.D offers a brief overview of the history, structure, and 
jurisdiction of the TCC. 
C. Taiwan: The Most Marginalized Democracy in the World 
Taiwan, an island nation of twenty-three million people, is perhaps 
the most isolated democracy in the world today.66 Indeed, it is besieged. 
                                                     
other Asian countries such as Indonesia and Thailand as examples of nationality systems that 
remain keyed to the father’s lineage); Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2002Hun-Ka14, June 26, 
2003, (2003 DKCC, 45, 67) (S. Kor.), English translation available at 
http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/att_file/library/decision_2003.pdf (noting that the domestic statute 
being challenged referenced a similar law in Taiwan); Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2002Hun-
Ka1, Aug. 26, 2004, (2004 DKCC, 11, 43) (S. Kor.), English translation available at 
http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/att_file/library/decision_2002.pdf (featuring a dissenting opinion that 
cited Taiwan, along with Germany, Denmark, France, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Brazil, as examples 
of countries that allow conscientious objectors to serve alternative, non-combat forms of mandatory 
military service). Indeed, in the last of these cases, the Korean Constitutional Court failed to 
acknowledge a Taiwanese decision that was highly relevant to the law being discussed. In response 
to the majority’s conclusion that conscientious objectors were not constitutionally entitled to serve 
an alternative form of mandatory military service, the dissenting opinion made a point of noting that 
Taiwan makes alternative forms of military service available to military objectors. The majority 
opinion failed to note, however, that five years earlier, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court upheld 
an earlier version of Taiwan’s mandatory military service law that made no such allowance for 
conscientious objectors. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 490, 12 SHIZI 20 (Const. Ct. Oct. 1, 1999) 
(Taiwan). 
64. The interviews were conducted by Professor Law, on some occasions in conjunction with 
Professor Chang and once with the participation of Professor Carol Lin of National Chiao Tong 
University, in a combination of Mandarin and English depending upon the preferences of the 
interviewee.  Some justices were interviewed more than once.  Professor Chang herself served as a 
law clerk to former Chief Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng of the TCC but is not counted among the 
interviewees. 
65. The quantitative data collection and analysis were performed by Professor Chang in 
conjunction with Professor Jiunn-Rong Yeh. See infra note 170. 
66. As of March 2011, the R.O.C. has official diplomatic ties with only twenty-three nations. See 
Diplomatic Allies, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN), 
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Despite the fact that it has never actually governed or controlled the 
island for even a single day, the People’s Republic of China (“P.R.C.” or 
simply “China”) views the fully democratic, functionally independent 
Republic of China (“R.O.C.,” now widely known as “Taiwan”) as a 
renegade province and claims sovereignty over the island.67 The 
perplexing state of today’s relationship between China and Taiwan is a 
direct result of the even more perplexing relationship between the two 
entities during the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries.68 
In 1895, Taiwan and a number of smaller, adjacent islands were 
ceded by the Qing Dynasty to Japan as part of the price for losing the 
Sino-Japanese War.69 Upon Japan’s surrender to the Allies at the end of 
World War II in 1945, the Nationalist (Kuomintang or “KMT”) 
government of the Republic of China, which had succeeded the Qing 
Dynasty, took control of the islands and declared them a province of the 
R.O.C.70 Four years later, however, the KMT government lost the civil 
war to the Chinese Communist Party on the mainland and retreated to 
Taiwan.71 The Communists established the P.R.C. in 1949 and claimed it 
was the only legitimate government of China, while the KMT 
government in Taiwan made the same competing claim.72 In the ensuing 
decades of intense diplomatic rivalry, the P.R.C. dealt Taiwan a massive 
blow in 1971 when the United Nations General Assembly passed a 
resolution expelling “the representatives of Chiang Kai-Shek” from the 
seats that the R.O.C. was deemed to have unlawfully occupied at the 
                                                     
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=32618&CtNode=1865&mp=6 (last visited Aug. 3, 
2011). For recent contributions to the debate over the R.O.C.’s status as a state from the perspective 
of international law, see, for example, JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 198–221 (2007); Lung-chu Chen, Taiwan’s Current International Legal 
Status, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 675, 677–80 (1998); Frank Chiang, State, Sovereignty and Taiwan, 23 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 959, 982–86 (2000); and Brad R. Roth, The Entity That Dare Not Speak Its 
Name: Unrecognized Taiwan as a Right-Bearer in the International Legal Order, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 
91, 110–14 (2009). 
67. See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 
328–31 (2d ed. 2004); Robert A. Madsen, The Struggle for Sovereignty Between China and Taiwan, 
in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 141, 158–59 
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001). 
68. See generally TAIWAN: A NEW HISTORY (Murray A. Rubinstein ed., expanded ed., 2007); 
SIMON LONG, TAIWAN: CHINA’S LAST FRONTIER (1991). 
69. The cession was pursuant to the TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, May 8, 
1895, 181 C.T.S. 217. See Chiang, supra note 66, at 995. 
70. See Madsen, supra note 67, at 147–48. 
71. See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 67, at 52–53; Madsen, supra note 67, at 148. 
72. For further analysis of the competing claims made by both the P.R.C. and R.O.C., see 
Jonathan I. Charney & J.R.V. Prescott, Resolving Cross-Strait Relations Between China and 
Taiwan, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 453, 458–73 (2000), and Chiang, cited above in note 66, at 998–99, 
1003–04. 
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United Nations,73 which included a permanent seat on the Security 
Council. Another blow came in 1979, when the United States withdrew 
its formal recognition of the R.O.C. and established formal diplomatic 
ties with China in its place,74 although the United States remains 
responsible by statute for Taiwan’s defense.75 Since that time, the P.R.C. 
has leveraged its massive and escalating economic and political clout to 
quash the R.O.C.’s dwindling diplomatic ties with other states76 and 
prevent it from participating in international treaty regimes or 
organizations, especially (but not limited to) those related in any way to 
the United Nations.77 At present, the R.O.C. is able only on rare 
                                                     
73. G.A. Res. 2758, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 29, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); see Madsen, 
supra note 67, at 156 (describing the R.O.C.’s attempt to “salvage a bit of pride” by walking out of 
the General Assembly before it could be expelled).  Chiang Kai-Shek was at that time President of 
the R.O.C. For further background, see generally HARVEY J. FELDMAN, TAIWAN AND THE UNITED 
NATIONS: CONFLICT BETWEEN DOMESTIC POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES 15 (1995). 
74. For further elaboration, see, for example, JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE, CROSSING THE DIVIDE: AN 
INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF NORMALIZATION OF U.S.–CHINA RELATIONS 179–85 (1997). 
75. Congress responded in 1979 to the Carter Administration’s termination of diplomatic ties 
with Taiwan by enacting the Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14, (codified at 22 
U.S.C. §§ 3301–16 (1979)), and making the act effective retroactively to January 1 of that year. See 
CONG. REC. H1668-70 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1979). The goal of the Act was to preserve stability in the 
region and maintain growing trade relations with Taiwan without offending the P.R.C. government. 
The Act refers to the R.O.C. government and its successors on this island as “the governing 
authorities on Taiwan” rather than the “Republic of China,” but also provides that references in U.S. 
law to foreign countries, nations, states, or governments will be deemed to include Taiwan. 22 
U.S.C. § 3303. With respect to Taiwan’s military security, the Act obligates the United States “to 
provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” and “to maintain the capacity of the United 
States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or 
the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” Id. § 3301. 
76. See Foreign Policy Report, 7th Congress of the Legislative Yuan, 1st Session (Mar. 5, 2008), 
in 26 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 205, 214 (2008) (reporting that China is pursuing all 
possible strategies to take away Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies and cut off Taiwanese 
participation in the international arena). 
77. At present, Taiwan cannot join treaties, conventions, organizations, or even economic 
cooperation organizations, such as the World Bank, that happen to be affiliated in any way with the 
United Nations. Thus, for example, Taiwan’s ongoing efforts to ratify the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—which include unilateral legislative incorporation of the 
covenant into domestic law—have, at best, been ignored by the U.N. Secretary-General and, at 
worst, explicitly rebuffed. In 2007, Taiwan signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and issued the first state report two years later. In 2009, 
the legislature ratified the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and also enacted an Implementation Act that incorporated the rights found in the 
two covenants into domestic law. However, Taiwan’s efforts to formally ratify the ICCPR, IESCR, 
and CEDAW were all rebuffed by the U.N. Secretary-General on the basis of the 1971 General 
Assembly resolution that expelled Taiwan. See Wen-Chen Chang, An Isolated Nation with Global-
Minded Citizens: Bottom-up Transnational Constitutionalism in Taiwan, 4 NTU L. REV. 203, 210, 
226 (2009). 
Some of the myriad and often petty ways in which the P.R.C. and its proxies have hounded 
Taiwanese judges and professors at international events and venues are documented below. See 
infra Part III.E (describing, inter alia, the P.R.C.-instigated expulsion of Taiwan’s national 
WLR_October_Law_FINAL.doc 10/21/2011  1:16 PM 
2011] GLOBAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE 543 
 
occasions to participate in international activities or organizations, and 
even then only in a limited capacity as a wholly economic entity78 or 
under the strategically ambiguous pseudonym of “Chinese Taipei,” 
which the P.R.C. has sometimes deemed acceptable in the context of 
cultural events such as athletic competitions and beauty pageants.79 
This oppressive and growing isolation has not prevented Taiwan, 
however, from making extremely robust economic and political progress 
since the 1980s. Political liberalization and democratization have 
occurred hand-in-hand with double-digit economic growth.80 The 
organization of Taiwan’s first opposition party, the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) was tolerated in 1986, and martial law was 
formally lifted in 1987.81 As a consequence of both Taiwan’s unique 
history and the KMT regime’s need for formal institutions that would 
legitimize its continuing rule, the majority of the R.O.C.’s nominally 
elected legislators had occupied their seats continuously since 1948 on 
the basis that the areas they represented were under Communist control 
and could no longer hold elections.82 In 1990, however, the 
Constitutional Court rendered a sweeping decision ordering these 
superannuated incumbents to leave office and mandating new 
elections.83 The R.O.C. Constitution has since been revised seven times, 
and in 2000, Taiwan’s first democratic transfer of government power 
took place when the DPP candidate won the presidency.84 In 2008, the 
second peaceful transfer of government power occurred as the KMT 
fought its way back to control of both the executive and legislative 
                                                     
association of constitutional law scholars from the International Association of Constitutional Law, 
a private scholarly organization). 
78. For example, Taiwan joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a separate customs 
territory rather than as a country and has been able to join certain fishery conventions as a separate 
fishing entity. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 66, at 114. 
79. See Catherine Kai-Ping Lin, Nationalism in International Politics: The Republic of China’s 
Sports Foreign Policy-Making and Diplomacy from 1972 to 1981, at 234–62 (Feb. 28, 2008) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file with the author) (offering a 
detailed historical account of how Taiwan has been forced to participate in atheletic competitions 
under the name of “Chinese Taipei”); Chinese Taipei, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Taipei (last updated July 30, 2011) (discussing Taiwan’s use 
of the “Chinese Taipei” pseudonym in athletic competitions and beauty pageants). 
80. See HUNG-MAO TIEN, THE GREAT TRANSITION: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 17–18 (1989). 
81. See GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 118. 
82. See id. at 129. 
83. J.Y. Interpretation No. 261, 4 SHIZI 110 (Const. Ct. June 21, 1990) (Taiwan). 
84. See Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Presidential Politics and Judicial Facilitation of Political Dialogue 
between Political Actors in New Asian Democracies: Comparing the South Korean and Taiwanese 
Experiences, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 911, 911–12 (2010). 
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branches.85  Democracy in Taiwan is now characterized by, inter alia, 
fiercely contested elections at both the local and national levels, and an 
abundance of independent media outlets that habitually attack the 
government with a degree of dogged partisanship that even American 
observers might find startling.86 
D. The History and Structure of Taiwan’s Constitutional Court 
Established in 1948, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
China, formerly known as the Council of Grand Justices, is now one of 
the oldest constitutional courts in Asia.87 In the European or Kelsenian 
mold,88 the TCC is a specialized court with jurisdiction over 
constitutional questions raised by individual petitions or referred by the 
lower courts, jurisdictional conflicts between government agencies, and 
serious political matters such as presidential impeachment and 
dissolution of unconstitutional political parties.89 Apart from its 
                                                     
85. Id. 
86. Yeh, supra note 84, at 911–12; see also Chang Wen-Chen, Ling Lei te Hsien Kai Kung 
Cheng: Po Chien Tai Wan te Fa Chih Yu Cheng Chih Hsin Jen [Alternative Agenda in 
Constitutional Reengineering: Ensuring the Rule of Law and Political Trust in Taiwan], in HSIN 
HSING MIN CHU TE HSIEN CHENG KAI TSAO [CONSTITUTIONAL REENGINEERING IN NEW 
DEMOCRACIES: TAIWAN AND THE WORLD] 307, 307–09 (Yeh Jiunn-Rong & Chang Wen-Chen 
eds., 2008). 
87. Under the 1958 Act Regarding the Council of Grand Justices, the Court was known as the 
Council of Grand Justices and was later rechristened the Constitutional Court by the 1993 
Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act. See Wen-Chen Chang, The Role of Judicial Review in 
Consolidating Democracy: The Case of Taiwan, 2 ASIA L. REV., Dec. 2005, at 73, 74 n.1, 76–78 
(explaining the name change). The TCC was established in accordance with the Republic of China 
Constitution, which was promulgated and became effective in Nanjing, China in 1947. Upon the 
defeat of the Nationalist (Kuomintang) government by the Communists in the Chinese civil war, the 
government, including the TCC, relocated to Taiwan in 1949. See GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 107, 
111; TA FA KUAN SHI XIAN SHI LIAO [HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATIONS] 55–56 
(Secretariat Judicial Yuan ed., 1998). For a brief introduction to the Court and the content of the 
Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act, see Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act, 
JUSTICES OF THE CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN, 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p07_2.asp?lawno=73 (last visited Oct. 14, 2011). 
88. The goal of the drafters of the R.O.C. Constitution was apparently to create a court of general 
jurisdiction more akin to the U.S. Supreme Court that would have final authority over all cases, not 
simply constitutional questions. Due in large part to a drafting error consisting of the last-minute 
resequencing of relevant provisions of the constitution, however, the TCC found itself limited to 
abstract constitutional review and a handful of specialty jurisdictions enumerated in the constitution. 
See Wen-Chen Chang, Transition to Democracy, Constitutionalism and Judicial Activism: Taiwan 
in Comparative Constitutional Perspective 138–45 (2001) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale 
Law School). Since then, it has ruled that it may hear constitutional questions referred by the lower 
courts, thus conferring upon itself a form of concrete review power. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 590, 
18 SHIZI 90 (Const. Ct. Feb. 25, 2005); J.Y. Interpretation No. 572, 17 SHIZI 113 (Const. Ct. Feb. 6, 
2004); J.Y. Interpretation No. 371, 7 SHIZI 26 (Const. Ct. Jan. 20, 1995). 
89. Unlike other constitutional courts that can grant relief to litigants, Taiwan’s Constitutional 
Court only rules on the constitutionality of laws and regulations in response to petitions for 
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jurisdiction over constitutional questions and various political matters, 
the Constitutional Court is also responsible for issuing uniform 
interpretations of statutes and regulations in situations where the regular 
and administrative courts arrive at conflicting interpretations.90 This 
jurisdiction over uniform interpretations now constitutes only two 
percent of the Court’s caseload, down from approximately twenty 
percent in the 1960s and 1970s and fifty percent in the 1950s.91 
The Constitutional Court is composed of fifteen justices who are 
appointed by the President upon confirmation by the Legislative Yuan 
for a nonrenewable term of eight years,  with the exception of the two 
justices who serve concurrently as president and vice president of the 
Judicial Yuan and are not guaranteed a full eight years in office.92 By 
statute, the Court is to be composed of a mixture of legal scholars, career 
judges, legislators, and persons with a combination of scholarly and 
political experience. The Organic Act of the Judicial Yuan sets forth five 
categories of people who are eligible for appointment, and no single 
category is supposed to comprise more than one-third of the Court.93 In 
                                                     
constitutional interpretations. If a law or regulation is found unconstitutional by the TCC, the 
litigant who sucessfully challenged the law must then seek a retrial or special trial in a regular court 
in order to obtain the benefit of the TCC’s ruling. See Petition for Interpretation, JUSTICES OF THE 
CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p02_01_01.asp (last 
visited Aug. 6, 2011) (explaining the  procedures and rules governing petitions for constitutional 
interpretations); Procedure for Interpretation, JUSTICES OF THE CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN, 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p02_01_02.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2011) 
(explaining the Court’s procedures for constitutional interpretations). 
90. Ssu Fa Yuan Ta Fa Kuan Shen Li An Chien Fa [Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act], 
art. 7, 37 ZHONGHUA MINGUO XIANXING FAGUI HUIBIAN 25773, 25774 (2004) (Taiwan). 
91. See Chang, supra note 87, at 77 tbl.1. 
92. See MINGUO XIANFA amend. 5 (2000) (Taiwan). Prior to 2003, justices were appointed for a 
term of nine years with the possibility of reappointment. Under the system that was in place from 
1948 to 2003, there were six distinct cohorts of justices, each of which is known as a “term” of the 
Court: the first “term” was from 1948 to 1958, the second from 1958 to 1967, the third from 1967 to 
1976, the fourth from 1976 to 1985, the fifth from 1985 to 1994, and the sixth from 1994 to 2003. 
See Chang, supra note 88, at 203. The longest serving justice was Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng, who 
joined the Court  in July 1972 and left in September 2007. See Former Justices, JUSTICES OF THE 
CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_04.asp (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2011). Constitutional amendments adopted in 2000 introduced non-renewable eight-year 
terms for the justices and also staggered their membership, with the result that it is no longer 
possible to speak of a specific “term” of the Court that is defined by a fixed cohort of justices. See 
MINGUO XIANFA, supra, amend. 5. 
93. In order to be eligible for appointment to the Constitutional Court, a candidate must: (1) have 
served as a justice of the Supreme Court for more than ten years with a distinguished record; (2) 
have served as a member of the Legislative Yuan for more than nine years with distinguished 
contributions; (3) have been a professor of a major field of law at a university for more than ten 
years and have authored publications in a specialized field; (4) have served on the International 
Court of Justice, or have published authoritative works in the fields of public or comparative law; or 
(5) be a person highly reputed in the field of legal research and have political experience. In 
addition, the number of justices appointed under any one of the above categories is not to exceed 
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practice, however, flexible interpretation of the categories has meant that 
the vast majority of those appointed have been either career judges with 
prior experience on the Supreme Court or Supreme Administrative 
Court, or law professors.94 Nine out of the current fifteen justices are 
legal scholars; of the remainder, five are career judges, and only one is a 
former private attorney.95 Very rarely are private attorneys appointed to 
the Court.96 
Thanks in part to the heavy representation of former academics, the 
justices collectively possess impressive educational credentials and 
considerable expertise in foreign law. In Taiwan, a doctorate in the form 
of either a Ph.D. or J.S.D. is effectively a prerequisite to becoming a law 
professor, and universities tend to value foreign legal training in 
particular.97 The nine law professors currently on the Court are typical in 
this regard: eight hold doctorates in law from Germany, while the last 
holds a doctorate from the United States.98 In addition to these nine 
                                                     
one-third of the total number of justices. See Ssu Fa Yuan Tsu Chih Fa [Organic Act of the Judicial 
Yuan], art. 4, para.1, 37 ZHONGHUA MINGUO XIANXING FAGUI HUIBIAN 25399, 25400 (1957) 
(Taiwan), English translation available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p07_2.asp?lawno=73. The former scholars on the 
Court are in practice appointed under the third, fourth, and fifth categories, whereas the career 
judges are appointed mostly under the first and fifth categories. In recent years, no justices have 
been appointed under the second category (namely, legislator with more than ten years’ experience). 
Because Taiwan is no longer recognized as a state by the United Nations, see supra note 73 and 
accompanying text, no one from Taiwan can be appointed to the International Court of Justice, and 
it has thus become impossible for anyone to be appointed to the Court under the first clause of 
category four. 
94. See Chang, supra note 87, at 75. 
95. The current President of the Judicial Yuan and Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court was a 
private attorney for about forty years prior to joining the Court. See Hau-Min Rai, JUSTICES OF THE 
CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN, 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_03_01.asp?curno=24 (last visited Oct. 14, 
2011). 
96. See Chang, supra note 88, at 209–10. 
97. For example, at National Taiwan University College of Law, the top law school in Taiwan, 
there are at present forty full-time law professors, including associate and assistant professors. 
Among them, seventeen hold doctorates from Germany, eleven from the United States, seven from 
Japan, three from England, and one from France. Only one was educated entirely in Taiwan. See 
Full Time Professors, NTU COLLEGE OF LAW, 
http://www.law.ntu.edu.tw/english/full_time_professors.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2011). The 
dominance of foreign-trained faculty is typical of other law schools in Taiwan as well and reflects a 
combination of historical context and academic politics. See infra notes 239–246 and accompanying 
text (discussing the patchwork of foreign influences that make up Taiwanese law and the 
consequent habitual use of foreign law by Taiwanese scholars and judges). 
98. Brief biographies of the current justices are available at the Constitutional Court’s English-
language website. See Justices, JUSTICES OF THE CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN, 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_03.asp (last visited July 20, 2011). The 
predominance of justices from scholarly backgrounds is a fairly recent phenomenon. Prior to the 
1980s, legal scholars typically constituted from one-third to less than one-half of the Court. See 
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former professors, two of the other current members of the TCC hold 
foreign LL.M.s, one from Japan, the other from the United States.99 
Thus, over two-thirds of the current justices have been formally trained 
overseas in foreign law. Only one of the fifteen justices holds neither an 
LL.M. nor a Ph.D.100 
The TCC’s law clerks—one for each justice—also bring a 
combination of advanced legal training and exposure to foreign law to 
their work. An LL.M., either foreign or domestic, is a de facto 
requirement to be hired as a clerk.101 There is no fixed term of service 
for the clerks, who tend to serve for longer than just one year and are 
often concurrently enrolled in domestic Ph.D. programs or preparing to 
apply for Ph.D. programs overseas.102 As a result of both their length of 
service and their advanced training, Taiwan’s law clerks tend to have 
more experience and to know more about foreign law than their 
American counterparts. Law clerk hiring turns heavily on word-of-
mouth and personal recommendations: many are recommended by the 
outgoing clerk or inherited from the previous justice, while justices who 
are former academics often hire either their own former students or those 
recommended by their former law school colleagues.103 
As of this writing, the TCC has rendered a total of nearly seven 
hundred constitutional interpretations over the course of its existence.104 
The bulk of these decisions postdate the democratization and 
constitutional reforms of the late 1980s.105 The Court currently issues 
                                                     
Chang, supra note 88, at 75; Former Justices, JUSTICES OF THE CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN, 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_04.asp (last visited July 20, 2011) (listing all 
former justices). 
99. See Pi-Hu Hsu, JUSTICES OF THE CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN, 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_03_01.asp?curno=34 (last visited July 19, 
2011) (listing an LL.M. from Columbia Law School); Hau-Min Rai, supra note 95 (listing an LL.M. 
from the University of Tokyo). 
100. See Chi-Ming Chih, JUSTICES OF THE CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN, 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_03_01.asp?curno=88 (last visited Sept. 20, 
2011). 
101. See Interview with Clerk 1, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 17, 2010). 
102. See id. (noting that the justice for whom she works has had a total of four clerks in seven 
years). 
103. For example, upon her graduation from the graduate program of National Taiwan University 
College of Law, Professor Chang was hired as a law clerk to former Chief Justice Yueh-Sheng 
Weng, who was a professor at National Taiwan University College of Law and continued to serve 
as an adjunct professor there. 
104. As of September 20, 2011, it had rendered 689 interpretations. See Interpretations, JUSTICES 
OF THE CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03.asp (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
105. The TCC rendered 79 constitutional interpretations in its first term (1948–1958), 43 in its 
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about twenty to thirty constitutional interpretations per year, of which 
roughly one-quarter to one-third result in a finding of 
unconstitutionality.106 The TCC has been praised by many for 
facilitating Taiwan’s relatively smooth and rapid transition to 
democracy, and for proving itself a strong guardian of individual rights 
and freedoms.107 
E. The Growing Isolation of Taiwan’s Judges 
China’s efforts to isolate Taiwan—both literally and figuratively a 
small island of democracy—are not merely disheartening, but also 
stunningly comprehensive. The dwindling handful of countries with 
which Taiwan still enjoys diplomatic relations108 are the few remaining 
places in the world where the Justices of the Constitutional Court can 
expect a red-carpet welcome. South Africa under apartheid was one such 
country; visiting members of the TCC attended a party in their honor 
with members of the South African Constitutional Court and were even 
treated to a tour of the country.109 Today, the members of the TCC can 
still look forward to a warm welcome if they visit Panama or Burkina 
Faso. But such hospitality is disappearing in tandem with Taiwan’s 
diplomatic relations. 
Membership in international organizations also poses challenges for 
the TCC and its justices. Last year, for example, the Association of 
Asian Constitutional Court Judges established a new organization, the 
Association of Asian Constitutional Courts.110 Much of the impetus for 
the formation of this organization came reportedly from members of the 
South Korean Constitutional Court, one of whom contacted a member of 
the TCC.111  The TCC did not receive an actual invitation to join the new 
                                                     
second term (1958–1967), 24 in its third term (1967–1976), 53 in its fourth term (1976–1985), 167 
in its fifth term (1985–1994), and 200 in its sixth term (1994–2003). The cohort of justices 
appointed in 2003 has thus far rendered an additional 119 interpretations. See Chang, supra note 87, 
at 77 tbl.1. 
106. See Chang, supra note 87, at 85 tbl.5. 
107. See GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 144–57; Chang, supra note 87, at 83–85. 
108. See supra note 66. 
109. See Interview with Justice D, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 26, 2010); Interview with Justice E, Current or Former 
Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 3, 2010). 
110. See Rule of Law Programme Asia, KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG, 
http://www.kas.de/rspa/en/events/41710/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2011) (noting the adoption of the 
“Jakarta Declaration” establishing the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts). 
111. A subsequent interview with a member of the Korean Constitutional Court confirmed the 
prominent role of that court in organizing the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts.  See 
Interview with Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of Korea, in Seoul, Korea (July 6, 
2011). 
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association, however, but was merely invited to apply for membership. 
Ultimately, after some internal discussion, the TCC decided not to apply, 
partly for fear of the potential “embarrassment” that might result if 
China were subsequently asked to participate.112 A number of justices 
expressed concern that if the TCC were to join first under its proper 
name, the “Constitutional Court of the Republic of China,” and then 
China were to join subsequently, China might insist that the TCC be 
forced to participate under a different name or ejected from the 
organization entirely, a possibility that they wished to avoid.113 
Participation by individual justices in international associations and 
conferences is no less problematic. As one justice glumly remarked, 
China’s unrelenting exertion of pressure on other countries makes it 
“hard for us to attend conferences.”114 In many cases, they are simply 
not invited. The website for the latest World Congress of Constitutional 
Justice, for example, proudly boasts the participation of no fewer than 
eighty-eight constitutional courts and ten regional court associations.115 
Yet not only was no one from the TCC invited, but the justices who 
relayed this fact to us reported that they had not even heard of the event 
until we asked them about it.116 One of the justices deemed Taiwan’s 
exclusion unsurprising in light of the fact that the conference was hosted 
by the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil and sponsored by the Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe, neither of which is keen to 
complicate relations with China. Even if there are no political barriers to 
Taiwanese participation in a particular gathering of judges, however, a 
small country such as Taiwan is easily overlooked or ignored by the 
                                                     
112. See Interview with Justice A, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 18, 2010); Interview with Justice I, Current or Former 
Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 27, 2010); Interview 
with Justice I, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, 
Taiwan (Dec. 18, 2010); Interview with Judicial Administrator in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 25, 2010). 
The justices were also aware that Japan had already decided not to join, although its reasons for 
declining were not known. 
113. See, e.g., Interview with Justice A, supra note 112; Interview with Justice I, supra note 112. 
Ultimately, neither Taiwan nor China joined the association. See The Statute of the Association of 
Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions, available at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/AACCEI/AACCEI_Statute.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2011). 
114. Interview with Justice B, Current or Former Justice of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 19, 2010). 
115. See List of Participants, 2ND CONG. WORLD CONF. ON CONST. JUST. (last updated Jan. 30, 
2011), http://www.venice.coe.int/WCCJ/Rio/WCCJ_List_of_Participants.pdf (listing the 
representatives of the eighty-eight constitutional courts and ten regional court associations that 
participated in the January 2011 meeting). 
116. See E-mail from Justice A, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of China, to David S. Law (Feb. 27, 2011, 08:29 CST); E-mail from Justice H, Current or Former 
Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, to David S. Law (Mar. 1, 2011, 03:14 CST). 
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organizers of such events.117 
In other cases, the justices may literally be turned away at the border. 
In 1983, for example, a number of judges from Taiwan—including at 
least one member of the Constitutional Court—arrived in Egypt to attend 
a meeting of the International Association of Judges. The group was not 
allowed to clear immigration and was forced to turn back.118 Another 
justice met a similar fate when she attempted to attend the 2004 biannual 
meeting of the International Association of Women Judges held in 
Uganda. All of the Taiwanese judges were denied entry visas, reportedly 
because China had offered to fund construction of a new building for the 
Ugandan judiciary and had made clear its desire that the Taiwanese 
delegation be barred from attending.119 
Indeed, China hounds Taiwan so thoroughly and relentlessly that it 
even interferes with the ability of law professors to participate in a 
private capacity in international academic meetings and organizations 
that are not sponsored by or affiliated with any government. One justice 
related the story of how an international conference organized by Pitman 
Potter, a distinguished scholar of Chinese law at the University of 
British Columbia, fell victim to a Chinese boycott just two days before it 
was scheduled to begin. Potter had invited scholars from both China and 
Taiwan to Canada, but the Chinese government would not allow its own 
scholars to attend an “international” conference if scholars from Taiwan 
would also be present.120 The fact that the justices call upon local 
scholars for foreign legal expertise121 and are frequently former 
academics themselves122 means that such efforts to isolate Taiwanese 
law professors reinforce the isolation of the TCC as well. 
Even more striking was the expulsion of Taiwan’s national 
                                                     
117. A case in point is Yale Law School’s oft-noted global constitutionalism seminar, now in its 
sixteenth year, which brings together constitutional judges from around the world on an invitation-
only basis for closed-door discussions. See sources cited supra note 43. On only one occasion—in 
1997—has a member of the TCC participated, and our interviewees knew of only one other justice 
who had ever been invited. 
118. Interview with Justice E, supra note 109. 
119. Interview with Justice I, supra note 112. 
120. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114; see also E-mail from Pitman Potter, Hong Kong 
Bank Chair in Asian Research and Professor of Law, Univ. of B.C., to David S. Law (Apr. 27, 
2011, 09:49 PST) (on file with authors). Chinese authorities indicated that holding the conference in 
Canada would impermissibly “internationalize” the issue of cross-strait relations, and that Chinese 
scholars would be permitted to attend such a conference only if it were to be held in China or 
Taiwan. Id.; see also Pitman B. Potter, Preface to LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 
MAINLAND AND TAIWAN, at iii, vi (Pitman B. Potter ed., 2006) (alluding to this incident). 
121. See infra text accompanying note 208 (discussing the TCC’s practice of convening 
informational sessions with academics). 
122. See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text. 
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association of constitutional law professors from the International 
Association of Constitutional Law (IACL) in 1999.123 Yueh-Sheng 
Weng, a longtime member of the National Taiwan University law 
faculty and at that time Chief Justice of the TCC, had been tapped to 
serve on the executive committee of the IACL in advance of the 
organization’s fifth congress in Rotterdam. Unable to attend the meeting 
at which he was to be formally elected, Weng designated Tzong-Li Hsu, 
a colleague at National Taiwan University who would later be appointed 
to the TCC himself, to travel to Rotterdam and attend the meeting in 
Weng’s place.124 At the meeting, however, China’s representative on the 
executive committee objected angrily to Weng’s selection on the ground 
that Taiwan was not a country and that Taiwan’s so-called national 
association of constitutional scholars was therefore ineligible to belong 
to the IACL.125 Hsu countered that the IACL was a private scholarly 
association, not the United Nations, and that Taiwan deserved to be 
included in an organization dedicated to the study of constitutionalism, 
given its own status as a constitutional democracy.126 The Chinese 
position prevailed, however, and not only was Weng denied a seat on the 
executive committee, but Taiwan’s national association was expelled 
from the organization, with the result that all scholars from Taiwan lost 
their membership in the IACL.127 Subsequent changes in leadership at 
the IACL enabled a handful to apply successfully for membership on an 
individual basis,128 but most no longer belong to the organization,129 and 
Chinese harassment of the few Taiwanese scholars who do remain 
                                                     
123. For a description of the International Association of Constitutional Law, see INT’L ASS’N 
CONST. L., http://www.iacl-aidc.org (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
124. Interview with Justice A, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 12, 2010); Interview with Justice C, Current or Former Justice, 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 26, 2010). 
125. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124; Interview with Justice C, supra note 124. 
126. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124; Interview with Justice C, supra note 124. 
127. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124; Interview with Justice C, Current or Former 
Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Mar. 4, 2011); Interview 
with Dennis T.C. Tang, Dir. and Distinguished Research Professor, Institutum Iurisprudentiae, in 
Taipei, Taiwan (Mar. 4, 2011); Interview with Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Distingushed Professor, National 
Taiwan University College of Law, in Taipei, Taiwan (Mar. 6, 2011). If Taiwan were to be 
considered part of China—as the Chinese scholars argued to the executive committee—then 
Taiwanese scholars could, in theory, seek continued membership in the IACL via the Chinese 
national association. To the best of our knowledge, however, no one from Taiwan has ever 
attempted to join the Chinese association. 
128. Professor Chang joined the IACL as an individual member in 2005. 
129. One prominent scholar reports that his application for individual membership, filed shortly 
after the expulsion of the Taiwanese national association, was never even acknowledged by the 
IACL. 
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continues in other forms.130 
One might think that China is especially anxious to prevent 
Taiwanese judges (and academics) from attending “international” 
gatherings because such attendance implies that Taiwan is a “nation.” 
But the obstacles that China has erected to J2J interaction involving 
Taiwanese judges are by no means limited to international meetings. 
Efforts by the members of the TCC to visit constitutional courts in other 
countries have also been frustrated by Chinese interference. The justices 
ordinarily receive a travel budget that enables them to visit courts in 
other countries for research purposes; the choice of destination is left to 
them, and in a typical year, a group of three or four justices will make 
use of the summer recess to visit a constitutional court that they find of 
particular interest or relevance to their work.131 Some countries, such as 
Australia,132 Hungary,133 and South Korea,134 were identified as 
relatively hospitable and trouble-free destinations, at least for a lucky 
few justices. It has also been “no problem” for the justices to visit 
Germany, although one justice warned that revelation of this fact might 
elicit “protests” from China.135 
In other countries, however, the welcome mat is nowhere to be found. 
A former Chief Justice of the TCC told of many such stories. On one 
occasion, for example, he had been invited to Argentina in his capacity 
as President of the Judicial Yuan, only to be denied a visa.136 On another 
                                                     
130. At the 1999 meeting, Chinese professors shadowed and eavesdropped upon gatherings of 
Taiwanese professors. Most recently, at the IACL congress held in Mexico City in December 2010, 
Jiunn-Rong Yeh of National Taiwan University was selected as a last-minute substitute to appear on 
a panel concerning the universality or particularity of constitutional principles. Neither the topic of 
the panel nor Yeh’s relatively abstract and jurisprudential presentation, witnessed by both authors of 
this Article, touched in any discernible way upon any question relating to either Taiwanese 
statehood or Taiwan’s relationship with China. During the question period, the chair of the session 
noted that there were still many in the audience waiting to pose questions during the little time 
remaining before recognizing Jihong Mo, a law professor at the government-run Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences and member of the IACL executive committee. See Brief Introduction of Mo 
Jihong, VIITH WORLD CONG. INT’L ASS’N CONST. L., 
http://www.enelsyn.gr/en/CV/Mo_Jihong.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2011). Mo proceeded to filibuster 
for most of the remaining time with an irrelevant, incoherent, and rambling question that boiled 
down to a contention that Professor Yeh lacked standing to address questions of constitutional law 
because Taiwan is not a country. 
131. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114; Interview with Clerk 2, Law Clerk to a Justice of 
the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 17, 2010). 
132. Interview with Justice I, supra note 112; Interview with Judicial Administrator, supra note 
112. 
133. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114. 
134. Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131 (describing an official reception held at the South 
Korean Constitutional Court for visitors from the TCC). 
135. Interview with Justice C, supra note 124. 
136. See id. 
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occasion, when he sought to visit Brazil, he was issued a visa but 
instructed not to visit the capital of Brasilia because the Chinese prime 
minister would be there at the same time.137 In some cases, unwilling 
hosts have resorted to face-saving avoidance techniques. For example, 
although judicial visits to France do occur, such visits pose “some 
difficulties,”138 and it appears that the French have on occasion found 
“diplomatic” ways of thwarting them139: the justices might be told that a 
visit to the Conseil Constitutionnel would require approval by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs140 or that the officials needed to authorize 
passage through France happen to be on vacation.141 
Similar episodes occurred in nearby Italy and Spain when a group of 
justices attempted in 2006 to visit the Italian and Spanish Constitutional 
Courts. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was told that a visit to the 
Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) could not be arranged because the 
entire court would be on vacation. After various efforts were made 
through unofficial channels to prod the ICC, the Taiwanese justices 
finally received word from an Italian academic that a visit to the ICC 
would in fact be possible, and that the Italian justices might even meet 
them. Ultimately, however, they did not meet any of their Italian 
counterparts but instead received a tour of the building and met with the 
ICC’s general secretary who, although “very friendly,” was unable to 
answer all of their questions.142 By contrast, the trip to the Spanish 
Constitutional Court promised greater success, at least initially. Word 
had been relayed through a Spanish law professor that the justices 
themselves would receive the visitors at the court itself.143 Upon their 
actual arrival at the court, however, the Taiwanese justices were told that 
the Spanish justices were too busy to meet them, and they were left 
instead in the care of a retired chief justice.144 Yet even this meeting 
might not have been possible had it not been for the academic contacts 
that one of the Taiwanese justices possessed at a university in Madrid.145 
Nor are countries with close historical or political ties to Taiwan 
                                                     
137. See id. 
138. Interview with Justice L, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Jan. 18, 2011). 
139. Interview with Spouse of Justice L, in Taipei, Taiwan (Jan. 18, 2011). 
140. See Interview with Judicial Administrator, supra note 112. 
141. See Interview with Justice C, supra note 124. 
142. Interview with Justice H, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Jan. 10, 2011). According to another justice, the TCC delegation also met 
a retired justice. See Interview with Justice G, supra note 19. 
143. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124. 
144. See id.; Interview with Justice H, supra note 142. 
145. See Interview with Justice H, supra note 142. 
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necessarily more receptive to Taiwanese visitors. Notwithstanding its 
primary responsibility for shaping Taiwan’s current legal system over 
five decades of colonial rule, Japan now keeps Taiwanese judges at a 
wary distance. Japanese judges and officials were described as 
“generally unwilling to meet” with Taiwanese visiting judges and more 
concerned with the state of their relations with China than with their 
former colony.146 The fact that some Taiwanese judges have obtained 
advanced degrees in Japan and thus know some Japanese judges 
personally, particularly those on the Japanese administrative courts, 
means that judge-to-judge contact remains possible at least on an 
unofficial, individual basis.147 On the whole, however, visitors from the 
TCC are “not as welcome there” as in other countries.148 TCC justices 
who wished to visit the Japanese Supreme Court were reportedly told 
that their Japanese counterparts could not greet them at the court itself, 
and a dinner meeting at a restaurant was arranged instead.149 If visitors 
from the TCC are received at the Japanese Supreme Court at all, it is 
generally by administrative officials or, at best, retired justices.150 
Members of the TCC have generally, but not always, enjoyed better 
luck when attempting to visit Taiwan’s closest and most important ally, 
the United States. A number of justices reported that they found it 
unproblematic to visit the United States, and when they have traveled to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, they have been met with hospitality. One 
Taiwanese justice recalled how, on his first visit to the U.S. Supreme 
Court over the summer of 1998, he and his colleagues from Taiwan were 
informed that their American counterparts were on vacation and thus 
unable to greet them.151 Instead, they were entertained at the Court by 
retired Chief Justice Burger, who served them afternoon tea, regaled 
them with stories about his grandfather’s dealings with the Qing 
Dynasty, and even praised the European model of judicial review as 
superior to the American model.152 Nevertheless, diplomatic obstacles 
can still interfere with judicial visits to the United States. On one 
occasion, while passing through the United States en route to Guatemala 
in his official capacity as head of the Judicial Yuan, Chief Justice Weng 
                                                     
146. See Interview with Judicial Administrator, supra note 112. 
147. See id. 
148. Id. 
149. See Interview with Clerk 5, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 22, 2010). 
150. See Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131; Interview with Clerk 8, Law Clerk to a Justice 
of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 26, 2010). 
151. See Interview with Justice C, supra note 124. 
152. See id. 
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was reportedly warned by Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs not to 
set foot in Washington, D.C., although New York was deemed 
acceptable.153 On subsequent official visits to Honduras and Panama, 
however, Weng was once again allowed to stop en route in the nation’s 
capital. Indeed, when he visited the Supreme Court en route to Panama, 
he was greeted by Justices O’Connor and Scalia and had his picture 
taken by the Court’s official photographer with Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Kennedy.154 For reasons that should by now be clear, 
Taiwan’s justices do not take such courtesies for granted, and the 
photograph is on display in the Judicial Yuan. 
As difficult as it can be for Taiwan’s judges to attend international 
meetings or visit courts in other countries, playing the part of host can 
pose even greater challenges. Inviting justices from other countries to 
Taiwan is, in the words of one TCC justice, “very hard.”155 
Notwithstanding Germany’s willingness to accept Taiwanese justices as 
visitors, reciprocal visits on the part of the Germans have proved harder: 
the President of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, for example, 
indicated with regret that it would be “difficult” for political reasons to 
accept the TCC’s invitation,156 and a number of justices reported that 
their success in inviting German constitutional jurists had been limited to 
retirees.157 On this count, the members of the U.S. Supreme Court have 
proved braver: Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia—who is no 
great fan of global judicial dialogue158—have all visited the TCC.159 
Even when dealing with the U.S. Supreme Court, however, the 
Taiwanese justices are wary of extending official invitations for fear that 
they are more likely to be rebuffed. For this reason, efforts to bring 
                                                     
153. See id. 
154. See id. 
155. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114. 
156. Interview with Clerk 3, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 22, 2010). 
157. See, e.g., Interview with Justice J, supra note 40; Interview with Judicial Administrator, 
supra note 112. 
158. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 859–60 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(protesting that “the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may 
think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution”). 
159. Justice O’Connor and her husband visited the TCC on September 5, 1987, and Justice 
Kennedy visited the TCC on September 6, 1994. Professor Chang acted as Justice Scalia’s translator 
during his visit to the TCC on September 19, 2002. Their visits are chronicled in Chinese on the 
TCC’s website. See Da Shi Ji Yao [Summary of Major Events], JUSTICES OF THE CONST. CT., JUD. 
YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p08.asp (last visited Sept. 20, 2011); see also 
Jimmy Chuang, US Supreme Court Justice Scalia Gives Taipei Speech, TAIPEI TIMES, Sept. 14, 
2002, at 2, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2002/09/14/0000167980 
(describing Justice Scalia’s visit). 
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Justice Souter to Taipei were conducted via a professor at Harvard, 
although the invitation was ultimately declined.160 
The TCC’s ties to the outside world are bolstered to some extent by 
the fact that the former law professors on the court possess an 
international network of academic connections, which they frequently 
employ in addition to, or in lieu of, official efforts by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to orchestrate visits abroad.161 For example, when the 
Chief Justice needed to pass through Paris in order to reach Burkina 
Faso as part of a diplomatic delegation, the Ministry reported difficulty 
obtaining the necessary clearance, ostensibly because the trip was 
occurring close to Christmas and the relevant French officials were on 
vacation.162 The Chief Justice ultimately solved the problem by 
contacting a French law professor he knew who, in turn, managed to set 
the bureaucracy in motion.163 
These backdoor efforts are at best partially successful, however, as 
illustrated by the recent trips to Italy164 and Spain.165 In an effort to 
salvage the visit to the Italian Constitutional Court, one former law 
professor on the TCC wrote no fewer than thirty-eight letters and e-mails 
to professors in Italy and elsewhere, and to judges outside of Italy, in the 
hope that word of mouth might encourage the Italian justices to meet 
with the Taiwanese group, and it initially seemed that this 
correspondence campaign might bear fruit.166 Similarly, it was a former 
professor on the TCC who initially secured the Spanish Constitutional 
Court’s agreement to greet the Taiwanese justices by calling upon his 
academic contacts.167 Yet the justices from Taiwan were ultimately 
unable to meet active members of either court.168 The effectiveness of 
academic backchannels as a means of overcoming Taiwan’s isolation is 
limited by China’s constant, petty efforts to prevent Taiwanese 
                                                     
160. See Interview with Justice B, supra note 114. 
161. An example of a country where the TCC has enjoyed unofficial academic connections in 
addition to official contact is South Korea. Although the Korean Constitutional Court did not balk at 
hosting an official reception for visiting members of the TCC, a number of the former academics on 
the TCC also visit South Korea routinely in their capacity as professors under the auspices of the 
Dong Ya Fa Xue Hui, or East Asian Legal Studies Association, which has been in operation for over 
a decade. See Interview with Clerk 3, supra note 156. 
162. See Interview with Justice C, supra note 124. 
163. See id. 
164. See supra text accompanying note 142. 
165. See supra text accompanying notes 143–44. 
166. See Interview with Justice H, supra note 142. 
167. See Interview with Justice A, supra note 124. 
168. See id.; Interview with Justice H, supra note 142; Interview with Judicial Administrator, 
supra note 112. 
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professors from participating in international events.169 
F. A Statistical Analysis of Foreign Law Citation by Taiwan’s 
Constitutional Court 
The published opinions of the TCC give the superficial appearance of 
a court that makes relatively little use of foreign law. Actual citation of 
foreign law is rare, especially in majority opinions. Analysis of every 
constitutional interpretation rendered by the TCC from January 1949 to 
June 2008—a total of 644 interpretations in all170—reveals that in only 
four cases (0.62%) did the opinion of the court explicitly cite a foreign 
judicial decision,171 and in only eight cases (1.4%) did the majority 
opinion explicitly cite a foreign constitution or statute.172 Citations to 
foreign law were much more common, but still not routine, among the 
554 concurring and dissenting opinions authored by individual justices: 
74 of these separate opinions (13.4%) cited foreign precedent and 
another 121 (21.8%) cited foreign constitutions or statutes. 
The foreign judicial decisions cited by the TCC originated mostly 
from Germany (206 citations distributed over 173 opinions), the United 
States (75 citations distributed over 65 opinions), Japan (40 citations 
distributed over 37 opinions), and the European Court of Justice and 
European Court of Human Rights (a total of 7 citations distributed over 
6 opinions). Decisions from France, Austria, Turkey, Canada, Hungary, 
Italy, Switzerland, the Philippines, and South Korea were also cited from 
                                                     
169. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (describing the travails associated with the 
participation of Taiwanese legal scholars in international academic organizations and gatherings 
when Chinese academics are also present). 
170. The authors are particularly grateful to Professor Jiunn-Rong Yeh for his generous 
permission to use findings from the research that he conducted in conjunction with one of the 
authors in an earlier collaboration. See Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn-Rong Yeh, The Explicit and 
Implicit Use of Foreign Precedents by the Constitutional Court in Taiwan, Presentation at the VIIIth 
World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law (Dec. 8, 2010). For further 
information about the collaborative, cross-national research effort of which this study of Taiwan 
formed a part, see Cross-Judicial Fertilization—the Use of Foreign precedents by Constitutional 
Judges, INT’L ASS’N OF CONST. L., http://www.iacl-aidc.org/?page_id=54 (last visited Sept. 19, 
2011). 
171. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 499, 13 SHIZI 1 (Const. Ct. Mar. 24, 2000); J.Y. Interpretation 
No. 392, 7 SHIZI 377 (Const. Ct. Dec. 22, 1995); J.Y. Interpretation No. 342, 6 SHIZI 124 (Const. 
Ct. Apr. 8, 1994); J.Y. Interpretation No. 165, 2 SHIZI 214 (Council Grand J. Sept. 12, 1980). 
172. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 632, 20 SHIZI 321 (Const. Ct. Aug. 15, 2007); J.Y. Interpretation 
No. 617, 19 SHIZI 341 (Const. Ct. Oct. 26, 2006); J.Y. Interpretation No. 601, 18 SHIZI 335 (Const. 
Ct. July 22, 2005); J.Y. Interpretation No. 587, 17 SHIZI 826 (Const. Ct. Dec. 30, 2004); J.Y. 
Interpretation No. 582, 17 SHIZI 519 (Const. Ct. July 23, 2004); J.Y. Interpretation No. 419, 8 SHIZI 
640 (Const. Ct. Dec. 31, 1996); J.Y. Interpretation No. 392, 7 SHIZI 377 (Const. Ct. Dec. 22, 1995) 
J.Y. Interpretation No. 371, 7 SHIZI 26 (Const. Ct. Jan. 20, 1995). 
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time to time.173 References to foreign constitutions and laws also 
centered most heavily on Germany, the United States, and Japan, in that 
order. 
The data reveal two strong predictors of whether a justice will cite 
foreign law and, if so, which country that justice will favor. First, a 
justice’s prior professional background is strongly correlated with the 
frequency with which he or she cites foreign law: justices who were 
previously law professors cited foreign judicial decisions four times 
more often than did those who were appointed from the career judiciary. 
References to foreign statutes and constitutional texts, however, were 
much more equally distributed between former professors and career 
judges.174 Second, there is a striking link between the educational 
backgrounds of the justices and the sources of foreign law that they 
prefer to cite. Eighty-seven percent of the citations to German 
constitutional jurisprudence and 60% of the citations to German 
constitutional or statutory provisions were the work of justices who had 
themselves obtained either master’s or doctoral degrees in Germany. 
Similarly, justices with some form of American legal training were 
responsible for 61.7% of the citations to American judicial decisions. 
G. Behind the Scenes: The Court’s Extensive Usage of Foreign Law 
Citation patterns are, however, a highly unreliable indicator of the 
extent to which judges actually consider foreign law.175 No court better 
illustrates the perils of using foreign law citation to measure foreign law 
usage than the TCC. Various justices explained that, as a matter of 
“tradition,”176 “convention,”177 and “judicial style,”178 opinions for the 
court are succinct and tend not to contain footnotes, which makes 
citation to foreign law difficult.179 In part, this style of opinion-writing 
reflects a feeling shared by some academics and justices that “official” 
                                                     
173. France and Austria were each cited a total of three times over the course of three different 
opinions. Turkey was cited a total of two times in a total of two opinions. Canada, Hungary, Italy, 
Switzerland, the Philippines, and South Korea were each cited once. 
174. Most citations of foreign judicial precedent are the work of justices from scholarly 
backgrounds (325 citations) as opposed to career judges (84 citations). By contrast, references to 
foreign constitutional provisions and statutes are equally common among former scholars (259 
citations) and career judges (249 citations). 
175. See supra note 38. 
176. Interview with Justice G, supra note 19. 
177. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114. 
178. Interview with Justice J, supra note 40. 
179. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124; Interview with Justice B, supra note 114; 
Interview with Justice G, supra note 19; Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131. 
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documents should not contain citations,180 and that it is “harder to justify 
mentioning foreign law in opinions” when “we feel we are writing for 
the country.”181 When exceptions to this unwritten rule against citation 
of foreign law are made, they are more likely to occur in those rare cases 
of unusual importance where oral argument is held.182 By comparison, 
separate opinions are more likely to contain explicit references to foreign 
law because they are free to assume a “less rigid” form.183 A distinction 
also exists between foreign and international law: treaties and other 
international legal instruments, such as the various United Nations 
covenants, are more likely to be cited than the domestic law of other 
countries.184 
For these reasons, failure to cite foreign law does not denote failure to 
consider foreign law.185 One justice offered by way of example a recent 
high-profile case concerning the detention of former president Chen 
Shui-Bian pending his trial on corruption charges. The TCC ultimately 
adopted a multi-part test drawn from German law that already resembled 
existing doctrine in Taiwan. Instead of acknowledging the test’s German 
provenance, however, the justices instead “digested” the German 
                                                     
180. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114. 
181. Interview with Justice G, supra note 19. We also asked several justices whether the 
reluctance to cite foreign law might be attributable in part to a separate opinion by Justice Herbert 
Ma in an important separation-of-powers case that had criticized the majority opinion’s citation of 
foreign law. Ma’s opinion argued, inter alia, that foreign law should only be cited in footnotes, if at 
all, and only for the purpose of providing additional examples in support of a proposition already 
established as a matter of domestic law. See J.Y. Interpretation 342, 6 SHIZI 124 (Const. Ct. Apr. 8, 
1994), English translation available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=342. The justices we 
interviewed rejected the notion that Justice Ma’s opinion had discouraged others from citing foreign 
law; one justice said, quite bluntly, that Justice Ma’s views on citation of foreign law had been 
“ignored.” Interview with Justice D, supra note 109; see also Interview with Justice J, supra note 
40. Our empirical analysis of the TCC’s opinions from 1949 to 2008 shows, moreover, that citations 
to foreign law have actually become slightly more common since Justice Ma’s opinion appeared in 
1994. As another justice observed, however, even if Justice Ma’s opinion itself did not lead to 
modification of the TCC’s citation practices, it did express a view held by some academics and 
justices. See Interview with Justice C, supra note 124. 
182. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124. As of this writing, the TCC has held oral argument 
in only six cases, the most recent of which was decided in 2005: J.Y. Interpretation No. 603, 18 
SHIZI 456 (Const. Ct. Sept. 28, 2005); J.Y. Interpretation No. 585, 17 SHIZI 723 (Const. Ct. Dec. 15, 
2004); J.Y. Interpretation No. 445, 10 SHIZI 15 (Const. Ct. Jan. 23, 1998); J.Y. Interpretation No. 
419, 8 SHIZI 640 (Const. Ct. Dec. 31, 1996); J.Y. Interpretation No. 392, 7 SHIZI 377 (Const. Ct. 
Dec. 22, 1995); J.Y. Interpretation No. 334, 6 SHIZI 17 (Const. Ct. Jan. 14, 1994). 
183. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114. 
184. Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131. 
185. The TCC is by no means the only constitutional court that makes a habit of considering, but 
not citing, foreign law. See supra note 63 (noting that the Japanese Supreme Court and Korean 
Constitutional Court tend not to cite foreign law in their opinions, even when it has actually been 
taken into account). 
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approach “into our own language.”186 The TCC’s decisions are rife with 
examples of such adoption of foreign approaches without explicit 
citation or acknowledgment. Proportionality analysis,187 the concepts of 
substantive and procedural due process,188 the political question 
doctrine,189 the distinction between content-based and content-neutral 
restrictions on expression,190 and heightened scrutiny of suspect 
classifications in equality cases191 are among the many recognizable but 
unlabeled foreign imports to be found in the TCC’s jurisprudence. 
In fact, comparative constitutional analysis is virtually automatic 
practice for a majority of the justices, even if there is usually no telltale 
indication of the scope of their foreign legal research. Typical was the 
view expressed by one former academic on the Court that the justices 
“consult foreign constitutional materials” in “almost every case.”192 
Another justice—also a former academic—estimated that they consider 
foreign law “ninety-plus percent” of the time, and he further described 
the rare exceptions as cases in which foreign law will obviously not be 
                                                     
186. Interview with Justice G, supra note 19. 
187. The principle of proportionality first appeared in J.Y. Interpretation No. 471, 10 SHIZI 456 
(Const. Ct. Dec. 18, 1998), English translation available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=471, and was later fully 
elaborated in J.Y. Interpretation No. 476, 11 SHIZI 59 (Const. Ct. Jan. 29, 1999), English translation 
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=476. Since then, 
proportionality has become a standard feature of the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence as well as 
in other areas of law. See CHANG-FA LO, THE LEGAL CULTURE AND SYSTEM OF TAIWAN 61–62 
(2006). 
188. The concepts of substantive and procedural due process were first introduced in J.Y. 
Interpretation No. 384, 7 SHIZI 226 (Const. Ct. July 28, 1995), and have since appeared in many 
other interpretations. See, e.g., J.Y. Interpretation No. 670, 24 SHIZI 1 (Const. Ct. Jan. 29, 2010); 
J.Y. Interpretation No. 664, 23 SHIZI 17 (Const. Ct. July 31, 2009) ; J.Y. Interpretation No. 636, 21 
SHIZI 1 (Const. Ct. Feb. 1, 2008); J.Y. Interpretation No. 588, 18 SHIZI 1 (Const. Ct. Jan. 28, 2005); 
J.Y. Interpretation No. 567, 16 SHIZI 233 (Const. Ct. Oct. 24, 2003); J.Y. Interpretation No. 535, 14 
SHIZI 357 (Const. Ct. Dec. 14, 2001); J.Y. Interpretation No. 471, 10 SHIZI 456 (Const. Ct. Dec. 18, 
1998); Interpretation No. 392, 7 SHIZI 377 (Const. Ct. Dec. 22, 1995). 
189. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 328, 5 SHIZI 481 (Const. Ct. Nov. 26, 1993), English translation 
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=328. 
190. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 678, 25 SHIZI 26 (Const. Ct. July 2, 2010) (regarding access to 
media); J.Y. Interpretation No. 623, 20 SHIZI 1 (Const. Ct. Jan. 26, 2007) (regarding obscene 
speech); J.Y. Interpretation No. 617, 19 SHIZI 341 (Const. Ct. Oct. 26, 2006); J.Y. Interpretation No. 
577, 17 SHIZI 319 (Const. Ct. May 7, 2004) (regarding commercial speech); Interpretation No. 509, 
13 SHIZI 298 (Const. Ct. July 7, 2000) (regarding defamatory speech); J.Y. Interpretation No. 445, 
10 SHIZI 15 (Const. Ct. Jan. 23, 1998); J.Y. Interpretation No. 414, 8 SHIZI 578 (Const. Ct. Nov. 8, 
1996); J.Y. Interpretation No. 407, 8 SHIZI 369 (Const. Ct. July 5, 1996). 
191. See, e.g., J.Y. Interpretation No. 666, 23 SHIZI 200 (Const. Ct. Nov. 6, 2009), English 
translation available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=666 
(indicating that the principle of equality requires a “substantive nexus” between the “legislative 
purpose” and any distinctions drawn in the law). 
192. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124. 
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relevant or useful, such as a separation-of-powers case involving the 
Examination Yuan, one of the five branches of a convoluted 
governmental structure that is wholly unique to the R.O.C. 
Constitution.193 
Even justices who use foreign law infrequently by the standards of the 
TCC still use it frequently in absolute terms. The most conservative 
estimate of foreign law usage was given by a law clerk who indicated 
that the justice for whom he works, a career judge, partakes of foreign 
law in one or two out of every six cases. Most, but not all, of the justices 
and clerks opined that those appointed from the career judiciary tend to 
be more “skeptical” of the value and relevance of foreign law.194 The 
justices who were not themselves former academics tended to be more 
circumspect about the extent to which they consult foreign law, saying 
only that “it depends on the case,”195 or that they engage in comparative 
research “only if we think there is relevant foreign law to guide us.”196 
All agreed, however, that consulting foreign constitutional materials was 
simply not controversial, and that there is no meaningful connection 
between a justice’s political ideology and his or her willingness to 
consider foreign law. As one clerk observed: “Conservatives use foreign 
law too. They all use it.”197 
The law clerks described an even greater degree of exposure to 
foreign law than the justices. When hired, they are often told that their 
“primary responsibility” will be “comparative legal research.”198 It is up 
to each justice how to select his or her sole law clerk. However, an 
LL.M. is a de facto hiring requirement, and many of the clerks receive 
part or all of their graduate-level legal training overseas.199 In addition, 
some justices seek to hire clerks with strength in a particular language, 
typically either English or German, that will be helpful for research 
purposes.200 Approximately 90% of the petitions received by the TCC 
                                                     
193. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114. 
194. Compare Interview with Justice C, supra note 124, and Interview with Clerk 6, Law Clerk 
to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 25, 2010), 
and Interview with Clerk 8, supra note 150 (indicating that career judges are less inclined to use 
foreign law), with Interview with Justice B, supra note 114, and Interview with Clerk 3, supra note 
156 (arguing that career judges are no less inclined to use foreign law). 
195. Interview with Justice G, supra note 19. 
196. Interview with Justice I, supra note 112. 
197. Interview with Clerk 5, supra note 149. 
198. Interview with Clerk 1, supra note 101; Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131. 
199. Interview with Clerk 1, supra note 101. 
200. Of the justices who make a point of hiring clerks with particular linguistic aptitudes, some 
justices seek out clerks who can compensate for their own weakness in a particular language, see 
Interview with Justice J, supra note 40, while other justices prefer clerks who share the same 
linguistic strengths as they do, in order to help them research the law of countries that they already 
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are dismissed without a ruling on the merits and thus do not call for the 
clerks to perform foreign legal research.201 With respect to the 10% that 
the Court decides to hear, however, comparative legal research is “the 
most basic thing” that the clerks do and is required “probably 100% of 
the time.”202 The clerks also reported that analysis of the TCC’s own 
precedent typically comprises only a “very small portion” of the reports 
that they prepare for the justices on each case; the “vast majority” of the 
typical report is foreign legal research.203 Foreign constitutional law is 
taken so seriously, in fact, that the Taiwanese judiciary itself publishes 
and sells hardbound Chinese translations of the case law of those 
constitutional courts that are considered most influential in Taiwan—
namely, the U.S. Supreme Court, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht 
and, most recently, the European Court of Human Rights, but no longer 
the Japanese Supreme Court.204 These translations are available to the 
general public and find their way into library collections throughout 
Taiwan including those of the justices themselves. 
                                                     
tend to consult most frequently, see Interview with Clerk 9, Law Clerk to a Justice of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 27, 2010). 
201. See Interview with Clerk 4, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 22, 2010). 
202. Interview with Clerk 3, supra note 156. 
203. Interview with Clerk 1, supra note 101; Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131. 
204. See Interview with Justice J, supra note 40; Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131; 
Interview with Clerk 4, supra note 201. The Judicial Yuan’s recent discontinuation of the 
translation of Japanese Supreme Court decisions was attributed to a combination of a “lack of 
resources,” Interview with Justice B, supra note 114, and the fact that the influence of the Japanese 
Supreme Court on Taiwanese constitutional law is “obviously declining, severely.” Interview with 
Clerk 2, supra note 131. This decline was attributed, in turn, to a variety of mutually reinforcing 
factors. One is the growing willingness and greater ability on the part of the justices to “cut out the 
middleman” and look directly to U.S. and German law, from which Japanese constitutional 
jurisprudence borrows heavily. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114; accord Interview with 
Clerk 2, supra note 131. Another is the fact that few of the current justices or clerks have Japanese 
legal training, which both reflects and accelerates the decline of Japanese influence. Third, and most 
interestingly, is a growing sense that the Japanese Supreme Court is simply too conservative and too 
willing to uphold government action for its decisions to be of continuing interest or use to the TCC. 
On the increasingly rare occasions that a justice attempts to argue in favor of the (invariably 
conservative) Japanese approach, other justices will now object that Japan is “not really an open, 
free country,” that there is consequently “no need to look at what they’re saying,” Interview with 
Clerk 5, supra note 149, and that Taiwan ought to look to “more advanced or progressive 
countries.” Interview with Clerk 6, supra note 194; accord Interview with Clerk 4, supra note 201; 
Interview with Clerk 8, supra note 150. Yet another cause, related to the immediately preceding 
one, is that Japanese legal scholarship has become a substitute for Japanese case law because, as 
compared to the case law, the scholarship is more “solid,” “fully developed,” and “critical” and thus 
of greater use to the TCC. Interview with Clerk 4, supra note 201. 
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H. How the Justices Do—and Do Not—Learn About Foreign Law 
Not surprisingly, the result of this routine and extensive investigation 
into foreign law is a constitutional court that is highly knowledgeable of 
how courts elsewhere have approached similar issues, even though its 
opinions tend not to reveal the scope of its knowledge. If the TCC fails 
to cite or adopt another court’s approach to a particular question, it does 
so out of choice, not out of ignorance. “If it’s been covered elsewhere,” 
assured one clerk, “they have considered it. They might not follow [the 
foreign approach], but they’ll consider it.”205 One justice explained the 
situation bluntly: “We are already fully knowledgeable about foreign 
law. The problem is translating this knowledge into our social and 
political context.”206 
But how exactly do the justices and their clerks acquire their 
extensive knowledge of foreign law?  It turns out that, for the most part, 
they do so in very old-fashioned ways: they study it in school, they 
conduct research, and they talk to their colleagues. Much of this research 
concerns legal systems to which the justices and clerks have already 
been exposed as graduate students: eleven of the fifteen justices hold 
either an LL.M. or Ph.D. in law from another country.207 Another 
important resource for the clerks when performing comparative research 
is the assistance of their fellow clerks. Rather than working in isolation 
for their respective justices, the clerks share offices with, and rely 
heavily upon, one another, thanks in part to the fact that they 
complement each other with different language skills and foreign legal 
expertise. Finally, if the justices feel that they need more information on 
a particular topic, they will convene an unofficial shuo ming hui, or 
information-gathering session, to which they will invite academics to 
discuss the topic and explain relevant foreign jurisprudence.208 These 
sessions occasionally include scholars from overseas; German public 
law specialists, in particular, are invited to the Court an average of once 
or twice per year.209 
What has transformed the way in which Taiwanese justices and clerks 
learn about foreign law is not an expansion of opportunities to interact 
with judges in other countries, but rather the increasing availability and 
utility of electronic research tools. Their research on foreign law is now 
                                                     
205. Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131. 
206. Interview with Justice F, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 27, 2010). 
207. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
208. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114. 
209. Interview with Judicial Administrator, supra note 112. 
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conducted “mostly” on the internet, but also through the online research 
services Westlaw and Beck Online, a German equivalent.210 There are 
occasions, however, when the Internet alone is not enough, and the 
TCC’s inability to obtain information through formal channels can 
complicate its efforts to obtain needed information. The story behind one 
high-profile decision illustrates the Court’s ability to overcome such 
challenges without the help of J2J dialogue, albeit in a highly 
roundabout fashion. 
In Interpretation No. 499, the TCC struck down as unconstitutional a 
constitutional amendment by which Taiwan’s National Assembly had 
sought to extend its own term of office.211 Given the sensitivity and 
importance of the case, the justices were keen to learn all they could 
about cases in which other constitutional courts had declared 
constitutional amendments unconstitutional, and the resulting decision 
was one of the rare ones in which the TCC actually cited foreign law 
explicitly.212 The justice assigned to write the opinion had read in a 
German law journal that the Italian Constitutional Court had previously 
rendered such a decision, and so he set about to obtain a copy of the 
Italian decision in Chinese for the Court’s use.213 Italy’s lack of 
diplomatic ties with Taiwan ruled out direct contact with the Italian 
government, and a request to Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 
help proved fruitless.214 Among the few states that do recognize Taiwan, 
however, is the Vatican. The justice thus contacted a diplomat he knew 
personally at the Holy See’s embassy in Taiwan, who promptly obtained 
a copy of the decision, but in Italian. Translation of the opinion into 
Chinese then proceeded on two fronts. The justice visited the nearest 
Catholic church and recruited the help of its priest, who had just arrived 
from Italy and did not speak Chinese, and together, the priest and the 
justice prepared a translation. Meanwhile, one of the Court’s clerks 
made contact over the internet with a law professor from Florence, who 
partnered with the clerk to create a translation of their own.215 
                                                     
210. Interview with Clerk 4, supra note 201; Interview with Clerk 5, supra note 149. Although 
the Court’s librarians do not help with substantive foreign legal research, they will acquire books 
upon request. See Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131. 
211. J.Y. Interpretation No. 499, 13 SHIZI 1 (Const. Ct. Mar. 24, 2000), English translation 
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=499. 
212. See id. (citing, among others, Corte Cost., 29 dicembre 1988, n. 1146, Giur. it. 1988, I, 5565 
(It.)). 
213. Interview with Justice D, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Mar. 3, 2011). 
214. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly responded that Italy lacks a constitutional court. 
Interview with Justice D, supra note 109. 
215. Id. The two unofficial translations turned out to be the same in all material respects. 
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Just as important and interesting as the ways in which the justices 
learn about foreign law, however, are the way ways in which they do not 
learn about foreign law.  Notwithstanding their tremendous knowledge 
of foreign law, there are two mechanisms in particular upon which they 
do not rely.  One way in which they do not learn about foreign law is via 
the submissions of litigants. A large proportion of petitioners to the TCC 
are pro se, and of those who do have lawyers, the briefs that they file 
may contain references to foreign law but are generally of “poor” quality 
because, with only “one or two exceptions,” law firms in Taiwan have 
no real experience with constitutional litigation.216 Nor does the Court 
receive amicus briefs.217 Oral argument, meanwhile, takes place only in 
unusually important, “extreme cases.”218 
Another potential avenue for learning about foreign law that appears 
to make little practical difference to Taiwan’s Constitutional Court is J2J 
dialogue, especially of the face-to-face variety. The justices largely 
rejected the suggestion that their isolation and lack of opportunities for 
personal interaction with judges elsewhere has either diminished their 
interest in foreign law or impaired their ability to learn adequately about 
it. Tangible evidence that face-to-face interaction (or a lack thereof) has 
in any way influenced the TCC’s use of foreign law is especially elusive. 
One of the twelve justices interviewed did argue that face-to-face 
interaction with foreign judges is “totally different” from ordinary legal 
research: this justice argued that such interaction is both more focused 
on “reality” (meaning candid) and more “to the point” (meaning 
efficient) than what is publicly available, but no examples were 
forthcoming.219 Another justice initially opined that “we can always get 
                                                     
216. Interview with Clerk 1, supra note 101 (indicating that some briefs from the law firm of Lee 
and Li are “much better”); accord Interview with Justice B, supra note 114 (identifying Lee and Li 
as one of the few law firms that handles constitutional cases on a pro bono basis); Interview with 
Nigel Li, Chief Exec. Officer, Lee & Li, Attorneys-at-Law, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 24, 2010) 
(estimating that his firm handles perhaps ten to twelve cases per year that culminate in an actual 
petition to the TCC, and that there are “maybe five or six lawyers” in Taiwan “who do this kind of 
work regularly”); Interview with Wei-Chien Feng, Attorney, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 24, 2010) 
(concurring in Nigel Li’s assessment of the size of the constitutional bar in Taiwan); Interview with 
Clerk 2, supra note 131. 
217. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114. Although the justices are apparently willing in 
principle to consider amicus briefs, the Court’s formal procedures do not contemplate that parties 
will file them; nor are there any organizations that attempt to do so. See Constitutional Adjudication 
Procedure Act, art. 13 (1993), available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p07_2.asp?lawno=73. 
218. Id. 
219. Interview with Justice J, supra note 40. A different justice did offer a modest example of a 
piece of information, concerning the motives behind South Africa’s abolition of the death penalty, 
that he did not feel he could have learned via more conventional means. This particular tidbit, which 
the justice found both interesting and surprising, was a South African judge’s observation that one 
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things in person that can’t be put in writing” but nevertheless concluded 
that he could only speculate as to whether face-to-face dialogue was in 
fact useful: in his view, it was “hard to say whether foreign justices are 
in fact more open [or] forthcoming in person than in writing. But maybe 
we are missing out if we don’t talk to them.”220 Still another justice 
offered weakly that exchanges with foreign judges “maybe stimulate 
mutual interest.”221 
For the most part, however, the justices were openly skeptical that J2J 
dialogue could bolster either their (already extensive) interest in 
comparative analysis or their (already extensive) knowledge of foreign 
law. Indeed, even the justice who expressed a fear of “missing out” 
observed that contact with foreign academics was probably an adequate 
substitute for contact with foreign judges: he himself “had no questions 
that could be answered only by judges, not by professors,” and the fact 
that so many constitutional judges are themselves former academics, as 
in Germany or Taiwan, makes foreign judges and foreign academics 
somewhat fungible sources of information about foreign law.222 There 
are no doubt cases in which more extensive J2J dialogue would simplify 
the TCC’s efforts to obtain needed information; the travails involved in 
obtaining a Chinese translation of a prominent Italian decision, described 
above, offer a vivid (if not necessarily representative) example.223 It 
appears, however, that the improvisation and ingenuity of the Court have 
proven sufficient to the challenge. 
Much of the justices’ skepticism about the value of J2J dialogue 
arises from their own experience with such dialogue.  Most of the 
justices described their encounters with foreign judges as too brief to 
permit any meaningful substantive discussion of constitutional law, even 
on those occasions when written questions and answers were circulated 
in advance so as to facilitate deeper discussion. These encounters were 
typically described as involving “maybe one hour or so for oral 
discussion,”224 or what one justice colorfully dubbed “just a light dip in 
the water,” with little opportunity for actual learning.225 Others 
                                                     
reason for the apartheid regime’s suspension of the death penalty was its fear that the Africa 
National Congress might eventually engage in retaliatory executions of white political prisoners if it 
took control. This justice also expressed the view that it would be easier to obtain relevant 
information on international human rights conventions through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs if 
Taiwan enjoyed regular diplomatic relations. Interview with Justice E, supra note 109. 
220. Interview with Justice G, supra note 19. 
221. Interview with Justice F, supra note 206. 
222. Interview with Justice G, supra note 19. 
223. See supra text accompanying notes 211–15. 
224. Interview with Justice G, supra note 19; see also Interview with Justice F, supra note 206. 
225. Interview with Justice E, supra note 109. 
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suggested that J2J dialogue of the formal variety involves little or no 
substance at all. Asked to describe the content of his own meetings with 
members of the U.S. Supreme Court, a former justice described the 
discussions as “formal,” “polite,” and concerned with such “ordinary 
topics” as their plans for life after retirement.226 Another longtime 
member of the Court was much more blunt. “Formal interaction really 
doesn’t matter,” he explained. “It’s really just social. Small talk. Doing 
real comparative law research is from the books. It is absolutely not 
substantive discussion. In fact, there is not even time.”227 The value of 
interaction with American judges, in particular, is sharply limited by 
American ignorance of foreign law: “U.S. justices,” he lamented, 
“barely can tell Taiwan from Thailand.”228 
Thus, on the rare occasions that the justices do engage in substantive 
J2J dialogue, it is not of the glamorous variety that occurs behind closed 
doors at international gatherings or prestigious law schools. Nor, for the 
most part, does it even occur face-to-face. One longtime member of the 
TCC observed that there were only two countries where visits would 
entail meaningful substantive discussion—namely, Germany and 
Austria.229 Instead, when Taiwan’s justices do engage in J2J dialogue, it 
typically takes the mundane form of e-mail communication with foreign 
judges to whom the justices already have personal or professional ties 
stemming from their own education abroad or past experience as 
academics.230 In practice, this means simply that some of the German-
trained justices e-mail questions directly to members of the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. Various justices described the existence of 
“generally strong personal connections” to the German court that enable 
them to e-mail their German counterparts and ask, in connection with 
specific cases, “from your perspective, what should we consider or look 
at, what do you think?”231 
                                                     
226. Interview with Justice C, supra note 124. 
227. Interview with Justice D, supra note 109. 
228. Id. 
229. See id. 
230. See, e.g., Interview with Justice B, supra note 114; Interview with Justice H, supra note 142. 
231. Interview with Justice C, supra note 124.  One German-trained justice recalled, for example, 
writing over ten e-mails to various members of the German court specializing in both public law 
and criminal law in connection with a case involving the right to an interpreter in child custody 
proceedings.  See Interview with Justice H, supra note 142 (discussing J.Y. Interpretation 590, 18 
SHIZI 90 (Const. Ct. Feb. 25, 2005), which involved the right to petition the TCC for a constitutional 
interpretation in the course of a child custody hearing during which the trial court had ruled 
immediately on a constitutional challenge to a statute instead of referring the constitutional question 
to the TCC). 
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III. THE CAUSES OF COMPARATIVISM: WHY THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT AND TAIWANESE CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT APPROACH FOREIGN LAW SO DIFFERENTLY 
Comparison of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court and U.S. 
Supreme Court sheds considerable light upon the question of what role, 
if any, J2J dialogue plays in determining the extent to which a 
constitutional court will make use of foreign law. On the one hand, if J2J 
dialogue on human rights issues were necessary for courts to make use 
of foreign law, then a marginalized, isolated court, such as the TCC, 
ought to make little or no use of foreign law. On the other hand, if J2J 
dialogue does indeed whet the judicial appetite for comparative analysis, 
then the U.S. Supreme Court, whose members are inundated with 
opportunities to network with foreign judges, ought to be a ferocious 
consumer of foreign law. Indeed, if scholarly depictions of the forms and 
avenues of J2J dialogue are accurate, nowhere are the opportunities for 
J2J interaction richer than at a handful of elite law schools located a 
short train ride from the U.S. Supreme Court.232 
Yet precisely the opposite is true. The U.S. Supreme Court has, in 
fact, been singled out for criticism for its failure to participate in global 
judicial dialogue.233 Even though its references to foreign law in a 
handful of relatively recent high-profile constitutional cases have 
attracted enormous attention,234 the use of foreign law remains anything 
but routine, and it is open to dispute whether the Court is in fact making 
more frequent use of foreign law than it has done in the past.235 By 
                                                     
232. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 66–67; Waters, supra note 3, at 492. 
233. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 145–46 (1991) (“Except for Justice Story, who died in 1845, no American Supreme 
Court justice has shown as much interest in the law of other nations as many foreign judges now do 
in ours.”); L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 15, 37–38 (observing that “American judgments 
almost never consider the reasoning of other courts,” and arguing that “the failure of the United 
States Supreme Court to take part in the international dialogue among the courts of the world, 
particularly on human rights issues, is contributing to a growing isolation and diminished 
influence”). 
234. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033–34 (2010) (citing a 
“global consensus” against the practice of sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole, and noting that the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
specifically prohibits the practice); Law, supra note 1, at 653–59 (describing the controversy over 
earlier references by the Court to foreign law). 
235. Compare, e.g., Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 6, at 838–39 (concluding that, since 1940, 
“the Supreme Court has greatly accelerated the number of references it has made to foreign law in 
constitutional cases,” “especially in the area of criminal law, and in progressively more 
controversial and groundbreaking cases”), and Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1323–24 (arguing that 
“[t]he Supreme Court has made a conscious turn toward international judicial dialogue” in recent 
years), with Zaring, supra note 2, at 299, 331 (indicating that “the Supreme Court uses less foreign 
law now than it has at any other time in its history,” and finding “little evidence” that the use of 
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contrast, it is difficult to imagine how any court could engage more often 
in comparative analysis than the Taiwanese Constitutional Court. 
Comparison of the two courts thus only reinforces the conclusion that 
direct interaction between judges has relatively little impact on the 
degree to which constitutional courts engage in comparative analysis. 
More likely explanations for the TCC’s extensive use of foreign law 
involve much deeper causes. From a functional perspective, it is unclear 
whether Taiwan possesses the resources to rely exclusively upon 
domestic constitutional law. Unlike the United States, Taiwan does not 
possess the corpus of constitutional jurisprudence that comes with over 
two centuries of experience with judicial review; indeed, it emerged 
from authoritarian rule less than three decades ago.236 The relative 
brevity of Taiwan’s experience with democracy means that the TCC has 
less homegrown material to draw upon and thus faces a practical need to 
look elsewhere for inspiration.237 Another relevant factor in Taiwan’s 
case may be that of sheer size—or lack thereof. One justice went so far 
as to suggest that Taiwan lacks the human capital to construct its own 
jurisprudence from scratch, especially when compared to such 
behemoths as Japan and the United States, each of which boasts a vastly 
larger population, a correspondingly larger number of law faculties and 
legal experts, and economies of scale that can support research 
infrastructure along the lines of Westlaw and Lexis.238 
Other explanations for the comparative leanings of the TCC are 
historical and political in nature. There is simply no debate in Taiwan 
over whether it is appropriate to be guided by foreign examples in 
constitutional cases because Taiwan’s entire legal history has been one 
of imposition and imitation. The fact that Taiwan was a Japanese colony 
for half a century, and that Japan itself imported vast swaths of German 
law, remains one of the biggest factors shaping the Constitutional 
Court’s patterns of foreign law usage.239 Consulting foreign law is an 
                                                     
foreign law as an interpretive aid by the federal courts “is growing or at all vibrant”). 
236. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (describing the TCC’s role in the democratization 
of Taiwan). 
237. See Interview with Clerk 3, supra note 156 (identifying a lack of domestic case law as one 
of the major factors that will lead the TCC to resort to foreign legal research in a particular case); cf. 
Tom Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of Constitutional Review in Korea 
and Taiwan, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 763, 790 (2002) (arguing that, because “legislatures in new 
democracies are typically underdeveloped and unable to carry out what might otherwise be their 
natural function of norm replacement,” “courts in democratic transitions” may end up “play[ing] a 
special role of looking abroad to transform their constitutional orders”). 
238. See Interview with Justice B, supra note 114. 
239. Cf. Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the Diffusion of 
(Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1813, 1831–42, 1849 (finding as an empirical matter that 
those who author corporate law statutes and treatises in countries that were once colonies are 
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“unthinking habit” inherited from that era, if not earlier.240 Indeed, a 
number of justices lamented that the construction of a genuinely 
domestic constitutional jurisprudence remains a work-in-progress, 
tentatively cobbled together from a variety of German, American, and 
other parts that have yet to be digested into something uniquely 
Taiwanese.241 At the same time, Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation creates a 
political incentive for the TCC to borrow from other countries. The 
justices are aware that Taiwan can generate badly needed support and 
acceptance among the international community by following in the 
footsteps of powerful and prestigious countries.242 Although such 
considerations are not foremost in the minds of the justices,243 the fact 
that they are present at all suggests that the TCC’s use of foreign 
jurisprudence from such countries might be considered a form of judicial 
diplomacy. 
This confluence of historical and geopolitical circumstances has 
created a domestic political environment in which judicial usage of 
foreign law is not only uncontroversial, but potentially even 
advantageous for the TCC. In especially controversial or politically 
sensitive cases, observed one justice, the ability to say “this is how it’s 
done elsewhere” and “we used a foreign mainstream standard” can 
provide a “kind of safe harbor” from criticism that the Court is simply 
                                                     
disproportionately likely to have studied law in the former colonizing power or another “core 
country of the same legal family”). 
240. See Interview with Judicial Administrator, supra note 112. 
241. See Interview with Justice B, supra note 114 (arguing that the reception of foreign law in 
Taiwan has yet to undergo the equivalent of “Japanization,” wherein one takes the foreign and 
makes it one’s own). Not coincidentally, the mixture of foreign components found in Taiwan’s 
constitutional jurisprudence mirrors the mixture of educational backgrounds found among Taiwan’s 
legal scholars, the vast majority of whom are trained in Germany, the United States, Japan, and 
England. See supra note 98. 
242. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global 
Constitutionalism, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1178, 1181–82 (2011) (arguing that “constitutional 
conformity” is an “attractive” strategy for “marginal states” “that struggle to obtain, maintain, or 
consolidate the recognition and approval of world society,” and that Taiwan in particular has 
responded to its diplomatic isolation “by adopting political and constitutional reforms that it knew 
would win the approval of a clique of powerful nations”); Interview with Justice G, supra note 19 
(observing that “we cite foreign cases” in part because “we are aware that what we do represents the 
country and affects how we look”); Interview with Justice J, supra note 40 (explaining that Taiwan 
hopes that democratization, respect for human rights, and being on the “frontline of the Freedom 
House rankings” will enable it to become “less isolated”). 
243. See Interview with Justice G, supra note 19 (noting that “how this makes us look 
internationally” is “a more distant consideration” for the justices when they decide cases); Interview 
with Justice J, supra note 40 (indicating that considerations of “global relations” and international 
“legitimacy” are neither the “biggest” nor “most proximate” cause behind the TCC’s use of foreign 
law). 
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making up answers out of whole cloth to suit its own naked desires.244 In 
other words, the practice of looking consistently to the same handful of 
prestigious and influential countries for guidance may be perceived not 
as a form of illicit judicial activism, but rather as a constraint upon 
judicial discretion and thus a source of legitimacy for the TCC. 
Perhaps the most proximate cause of foreign law usage by the TCC, 
however, is the educational and professional background of the justices. 
As previously noted, there is a strong correlation between where the 
justices happen to be educated and which countries they look to for 
guidance.245 In-depth questioning of the justices only confirmed the 
importance of the relationship between judicial background and foreign 
law usage.  Nothing commanded stronger agreement among the justices 
and clerks than the proposition that the justices’ predilection for foreign 
law is shaped by their background. As one justice bluntly put it, “only 
one thing makes a difference when it comes to use of foreign law: the 
judge’s background.”246 
Background, emphasized another justice, encompasses a variety of 
elements, “including not only foreign education but personal upbringing, 
family background, personal experience, who you normally come into 
contact with.”247 But the two most important elements are where the 
justices were educated, and what they did professionally prior to joining 
the TCC.248 First, it is clear, both from the justices’ own accounts and 
from empirical analysis of their opinions, that the justices tend to reach 
for the body of foreign law that they know best on account of their own 
training. As a result, German-trained justices and American-trained 
justices may often find that they bring very different perspectives to the 
same constitutional question.249 Not surprisingly, foreign training is also 
said to influence the clerks in the same manner.250 Second, although it 
may be true that career judges are “equally open-minded” to arguments 
                                                     
244. Interview with Justice J, supra note 40. 
245. See supra Part III.F. 
246. Interview with Justice D, supra note 109. 
247. Interview with Justice C, supra note 124. 
248. See, e.g., Interview with Justice A, supra note 124; Interview with Justice B, supra note 114; 
Interview with Justice C, supra note 124; Interview with Justice D, supra note 109; Interview with 
Justice G, supra note 19. 
249. Constitutional law scholars in Taiwan exhibit similar biases in favor of the countries where 
they were trained. See Yeh Jiunn-Rong, Fa Lu Hsueh Men Cheng Chiu Ping Ku Yu Chan Wang 
[Prospects and Evaluation of Development in Legal Academia], 27 KO HSUEH FA CHAN YUE KAN 
[SCI. EDUC. MONTHLY] 607, 607–08 (1999) (Taiwan). 
250. See Interview with Clerk 1, supra note 101 (noting, for example, that while American-
trained clerks find the concept of a “public forum” in the context of freedom of expression to be 
“totally basic,” German-trained clerks “don’t even think in terms of that concept”). 
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based on foreign law—particularly when those arguments happen to suit 
their own purposes251—the weight of both the qualitative and 
quantitative evidence suggests that former academics make more 
extensive and systematic use of foreign law.252 Thus, the fact that the 
composition of the TCC is tilted sharply in favor of foreign-trained 
academics is a recipe for extensive foreign law usage, and the fact that 
most of them received their graduate legal training in Germany is, in 
turn, an effective guarantee of German influence over Taiwanese 
constitutional law. 
There are at least two reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court, by 
comparison, lags substantially in its use of foreign law, notwithstanding 
its location at both the figurative and literal epicenter of J2J dialogue. 
One explanation, which has received extensive scholarly attention, 
would be that the Court feels at least somewhat chastened by the intense 
criticism (and even direct threats253) that its recent forays into foreign 
constitutional law have aroused. But another, no less important 
explanation would be that the U.S. Supreme Court, unlike the Taiwanese 
Constitutional Court, simply lacks the necessary institutional capacity to 
learn about foreign law in anything approaching a routine and systematic 
manner. There is no expectation or requirement, formal or informal, that 
the Justices have prior experience with foreign law, and they typically 
have no foreign legal training. The majority are not academics, much 
less academics with graduate training in foreign law.254 
                                                     
251. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124; Interview with Clerk 3, supra note 156; see also 
supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text (contrasting the foreign law usage of justices who were 
career judges with that of justices from academic backgrounds). 
252. See, e.g., Interview with Justice A, supra note 124 (“[C]areer judges are just conservative: 
they assume the law is constitutional and tend to seek evidence, including foreign law, that upholds 
the law.”); Interview with Clerk 1, supra note 101 (observing that former academics are “more 
systematic” in their use of foreign law and “more interested in the whole theory and doctrine” when 
deciding what theory to adopt); Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131 (observing that career judges 
will consider foreign law but are ultimately “less interested in importing the theoretical 
underpinnings of the doctrine, the whole system,” and “more interested in finding something that 
supports the result” and thus are content to “maybe just borrow a couple of arguments from the 
case”). 
253. Law, supra note 1, at 656–57 (describing the impeachment threats and even death threats 
made against certain Justices for referring to foreign law). 
254. All three of the former academics on the Court as of this writing studied abroad over the 
course of their formal educations, but none focused on law during their time abroad. Justices Breyer 
and Kagan both hold degrees from Oxford, but not in law. See Stephen G. Breyer, FINDLAW, 
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/justices/breyer.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2011) 
(indicating that Justice Breyer studied economics at Magdalen College, Oxford); Elena Kagan, THE 
OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, http://www.oyez.org/justices/elena_kagan 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2011) (indicating that Justice Kagan’s field of study at Worcester College, 
Oxford, was philosophy). Justice Scalia spent his junior year as an undergraduate at the University 
of Fribourg but focused on history, economics, and literature. See JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN 
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Nor, unlike many other prominent constitutional courts, does the U.S. 
Supreme Court even attempt to compensate for these deficiencies by 
hiring clerks or researchers with the kind of training, experience, or even 
language abilities, that might help fill the resulting knowledge gaps.255 
As Vicki Jackson observes, there are a number of ways in which the 
Court might acquire the capacity to learn about foreign law in a fair, 
transparent, and accurate manner.256 For example, it could introduce new 
briefing procedures that guarantee adequate and balanced participation 
by a combination of court-appointed experts and knowledgeable amici 
curiae.257 It might also hire foreign lawyers as clerks,258 or it could seek 
more generally to ensure that it “has within its institutional apparatus 
personnel with sufficient education and expertise to assist in research on 
issues of foreign or international law.”259 Instead, however, the Court 
makes do with the help of a combination of court and library personnel 
and an obscure arm of the Library of Congress called the Directorate of 
                                                     
ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 25 (2009). 
255. See, e.g., Ursula Bentele, Mining for Gold: The Constitutional Court of South Africa’s 
Experience with Comparative Constitutional Law, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 219, 244 (2009) 
(noting that justices of the South African Constitutional Court “have the benefit of up to five clerks 
selected from applicants around the world” in addition to two South African law clerks); Alexander 
Somek, The Deadweight of Formulae: What Might Have Been the Second Germanization of 
American Equal Protection Review, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 284, 284 n.1 (1998) (describing the Israeli 
Supreme Court as “the most important comparative constitutional law institute of the world,” and 
attributing its prowess at comparative constitutional analysis in part to its “practice of employing 
clerks from all over the world, who do the research work on their country of origin”); supra note 63 
(discussing the practices of the “constitutional research officers” and foreign law specialists 
employed by the South Korean Constitutional Court). Moreover, a court need not employ clerks or 
justices who are literally foreign in order to enjoy an institutional capacity for learning about foreign 
law. Although the Canadian Supreme Court does not make a point of hiring clerks from other 
countries, it enjoys both an innate knowledge of, and capacity for learning about, foreign law that 
the U.S. Supreme Court lacks. The unwritten rules governing the allocation of seats on the Canadian 
court on the basis of geography guarantee that a sizeable portion of the justices are native 
francophones with a civil law background. See F.L. Morton, Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter 
Canada: A System in Transition, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 56, 70 (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006). 
So, too, are a sizeable fraction of the court’s clerks. The infrastructure for this legal and linguistic 
diversification is both intellectual and historical: Canada’s law schools provide a combination of 
common law and civil law training in a combination of English and French. See Aline Grenon & 
Louis Perret, Globalization and Canadian Legal Education, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 543, 549–52 (2002) 
(describing how certain Canadian law schools ensure “direct access to Canada’s legal and linguistic 
duality” by offering both civil law and common law instruction, in both official languages). 
256. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 190–91. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 189. 
259. Id. The Korean Constitutional Court is pursuing such a strategy to a dramatic extent by 
establishing its own research institute to be staffed by scholars who are fluent in foreign languages. 
See supra note 63. 
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Legal Research.260 
Above all, there are structural limits upon what the U.S. Supreme 
Court can do to improve its own capacity for comparative analysis. 
Institutional factors well beyond the Court’s control mean that there is 
no meaningful pool of talent from which either potential clerks or 
judicial candidates with substantial foreign legal expertise can be 
recruited. The first such factor is the composition of the Court itself. 
Unlike in Taiwan, there is no quota of seats on the Court that are 
reserved for law professors with foreign legal training who are 
inherently likely to make enthusiastic use of foreign law. 
The second factor, which contributes to the first and defies easy 
reform, is the structure of legal education in the United States. Whereas 
basic legal training in Taiwan occurs at the undergraduate level, the fact 
that law is exclusively a graduate subject in the United States makes it 
less feasible for American lawyers to obtain formal training in foreign 
law in addition to their obligatory training in domestic law. It is less 
realistic to ask someone who already holds both undergraduate and law 
degrees to obtain an additional degree in foreign law as a condition of 
obtaining a clerkship than to ask someone who merely holds an 
undergraduate degree in law. Nor is foreign legal training made more 
attractive by the prospect of an academic job, as in Taiwan. Although 
law school hiring of teaching candidates who hold both a J.D. and a 
Ph.D. is accelerating, would-be law professors who obtained their law 
degrees in the United States do not go overseas for their Ph.D.s, and 
recent hiring trends offer little evidence that teaching candidates are 
rewarded by the job market for having foreign legal training.261 The 
dearth of such training on the part of the nation’s law professors, 
meanwhile, tends to ensure that little knowledge of foreign law will be 
imparted to the next generation of law clerks and judicial candidates. 
Thus, to the extent that the U.S. Supreme Court appears parochial in its 
choice of persuasive authorities, that parochialism can be traced back to 
the manner in which American law schools hire today’s legal scholars 
and train tomorrow’s law clerks and judges. 
                                                     
260. See id. at 189–91; Michael Ravnitzky, The Directorate of Legal Research at the Library of 
Congress: A Treasure Hidden Under a Bushel Basket, LLRX.COM (Nov. 22, 2006), 
http://www.llrx.com/features/lclegalresearch.htm (describing the Directorate of Legal Research as a 
“research department contained within the Library of Congress” that “receives scant mention even 
among the legal research community”). 
261. See Entry Level Hiring Survey 2010, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 12, 2010), 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2010/04/entry-level-hiring-survey-2010.html (listing the 
educational credentials of those hired into tenure-track teaching positions at American law schools 
in 2010); 2009 Entry Level Hiring Report, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 26, 2009), 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/entry_level_hiring_report (doing the same for 2009). 
WLR_October_Law_FINAL.doc 10/21/2011  1:16 PM 
2011] GLOBAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE 575 
 
CONCLUSION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACADEMIC 
PAROCHIALISM AND THE COST OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INFLUENCE 
We do not dispute that globalization has had a profound impact on 
the capacity of judges to interact across national borders and, indeed, 
upon the development of constitutional law more generally. Nor do we 
question the value of comparative analysis for constitutional courts 
around the world that increasingly find themselves faced with similar 
questions and equipped with similar analytical tools.262 It is both 
conceptually inaccurate and empirically unwarranted, however, to 
characterize the way in which constitutional courts currently use foreign 
law as a form of “dialogue.” And it is also doubtful whether actual 
dialogue of the literal, judge-to-judge variety has much impact on either 
the frequency or sophistication with which constitutional courts actually 
consider foreign law. As comparison of the Taiwanese Constitutional 
Court and U.S. Supreme Court demonstrates, participation in global J2J 
dialogue is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for meaningful 
judicial usage of foreign law and cannot compensate for an array of 
vastly more important institutional variables, such as the structure of 
legal education and the qualifications for judicial office. 
The manner in which constitutional comparativism has developed in 
Taiwan holds distinct lessons for those who wish to see the U.S. 
Supreme Court make greater and more sophisticated use of foreign law, 
on the one hand, and those who fear the decline of American soft power 
and wish to see the global influence of American constitutionalism 
restored to its former glory, on the other.263 For those who might wish to 
see the U.S. Supreme Court exhibit greater cosmopolitanism in its use of 
persuasive authorities, jawboning its members or inviting them to 
additional conferences and gatherings is likely to have little impact. The 
supposed parochialism of the U.S. Supreme Court should not be 
understood entirely, or even primarily, as a function of close-mindedness 
or stubbornness on the part of the Justices. At this point in time, the 
                                                     
262. See Law, supra note 1, at 697–700 (characterizing balancing and means-end analysis as 
inescapable and ubiquitous forms of “generic constitutional analysis”); see also ALEC STONE 
SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 32–33 (2004) (identifying the “reason-giving” 
requirement as a ubiquitous part of constitutional adjudication). 
263. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States 
Constitution, 97 NYU L. REV. (forthcoming June 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923556 (documenting the declining popularity of the United States 
Constitution as a model for constitution-makers elsewhere); Liptak, supra note 1, at A1 (citing 
evidence that American constitutional jurisprudence has become less influential in other countries, 
and that the Supreme Court’s own aversion to considering foreign law may be partly to blame). 
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greatest obstacle to a routine and sophisticated practice of judicial 
comparativism in the United States is not the unwillingness of individual 
judges to consider foreign legal materials. Within the last decade, no 
fewer than six different Justices publicly voiced their support for 
comparative constitutional analysis.264 As promising as such an 
attitudinal shift might seem, however, there is a world of difference 
between expressing support for comparative analysis in principle and 
having the wherewithal to actually perform such analysis on more than a 
sporadic, ad hoc basis. 
It is, instead, the political economy of American legal training that 
poses the greater obstacle to the emergence of robust judicial 
comparativism. The fact that American judges and law clerks examine 
foreign law far less frequently or thoroughly than their Taiwanese 
counterparts is hardly surprising given how few of them possess foreign 
legal training. To ensure an adequate supply of outstanding judges and 
clerks with such training would, however, require a sea change in 
American legal education. As long as American law school faculties 
neither place a premium upon hiring legal scholars with comparative 
training nor train their own students in foreign law, today’s law clerks 
and tomorrow’s judges and law professors will neither seek nor possess 
such training. American judges are not to be blamed if their own vision 
ends at water’s edge. They are simply products of the system that 
created them. The day that American law students prize a degree in 
comparative law as a stepping stone to a Supreme Court clerkship or a 
teaching position in an American law school will be the day that judicial 
comparativism has become truly institutionalized. 
For those concerned about the loss of American constitutional 
influence overseas, the case of Taiwan suggests even greater reason for 
despondency. Perhaps no country in the world is more dependent on the 
United States for its security than this small, diplomatically isolated 
island under constant threat from the world’s most populous country and 
(for now) second-largest economy. There may be no country that values 
its ties with the United States more highly. Yet Germany has far greater 
influence over Taiwanese constitutional jurisprudence at this point than 
does the United States. That influence reflects not simply the historical 
origins of the Taiwanese legal system, but also Germany’s extensive and 
                                                     
264. Indeed, at least as of 2005, those Justices who had publicly announced or demonstrated their 
support for the use of foreign and international legal materials as persuasive authority constituted a 
solid majority of the Court. See Law, supra note 1, at 653–55 (citing the public pronouncements of 
then-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer on 
the use of foreign law). 
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far-sighted investment in the education of foreign lawyers who will be 
tomorrow’s foreign leaders.265 
One could, of course, take a benign view of such developments. 
Constitutional democracy with a German twist is still constitutional 
democracy. Its spread serves only to advance democracy and the rule of 
law and poses no discernible threat to American interests. If loss of 
American constitutional influence in countries that are otherwise within 
America’s sphere of influence is indeed cause for concern, however, an 
easy and obvious solution suggests itself. Financial support for 
American legal training of foreign academics and judges—not least of 
all those in Taiwan who find themselves on the frontline of democracy 
and constitutionalism in Asia—is both morally and strategically sound. 
It is no coincidence that the one current member of the TCC with 
American legal training is a former Fulbright scholar266—or, for that 
matter, that the other eight former academics on the Court received 
equivalent scholarships from Germany.267 A relatively small investment 
in the noble cause of bolstering democratic institutions, and in a country 
that happens to be a close American ally in an increasingly treacherous 
region of the world, is likely to yield dividends and can do only good. 
 
 
                                                     
265. See Yeh, supra note 249, at 608 (noting the popularity of the German government-sponsored 
DAAD scholarship among Taiwan’s subsequent law professors and justices). 
266. See Tzu-Yi Lin, JUSTICES OF THE CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN, 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_03_01.asp?curno=31 (last visited Sept. 21, 
2011). 
267. In the flush of its postwar economic success, Germany launched a generous academic 
scholarship for which Taiwanese law students were eligible—namely, the Deutscher Akademischer 
Austausch Dienst, or DAAD—at roughly the same time as the United States began to scale back its 
economic and military aid to Taiwan. Most, if not all, of the German-trained law professors in 
Taiwan have at some point received a DAAD scholarship. This German influence has, in turn, been 
passed down from one generation to the next. One of the most important of these German-trained 
justices, Weng Yueh-Sheng, who was appointed to the Constitutional Court in 1972 and served until 
his retirement in 2007, obtained a Ph.D. from Heidelberg University with the support of a DAAD 
scholarship and shaped an entire generation of legal academics through his part-time teaching at 
National Taiwan University. See Yeh, supra note 249, at 607–08 (discussing the impact of the 
German DAAD scholarship on legal education in Taiwan). 
